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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.513
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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 June 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alfonso García Robles (Mexico)

GE.89-61604/0709B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 513th plenary meeting of the Disarmament Conference.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will today continue its consideration of items 1 and 2 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, under rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members may make statements on any other question connected with the work of the Conference if they wish.

On my list of speakers for today, I have the representatives of Indonesia and Sweden.

Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia): Let me, first of all, on behalf of the Indonesian delegation, warmly congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference for the month of June. It is indeed a great honour to have such an eminent and internationally renowned President guiding our deliberations. Your wealth of experience and expertise are universally recognized, and my delegation wishes to pay tribute to your unparalleled services in favour of a world in peace through disarmament. Knowing your dedication and perseverance in pursuit of the noble goals of disarmament, my delegation is fully confident that we will make significant progress under your able guidance. My delegation would also like to express its gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Simon B. arap Bullut of Kenya, who so competently guided our deliberations during the month of April.

In my delegation's statement today, I would like to touch upon both nuclear and chemical weapons issues. The present session of the Conference commences in an improved international climate in the relations between the major Powers - a positive development which my country welcomes. Here in Geneva, we have noted that the bilateral talks on strategic arms limitation and the talks on chemical weapons have reconvened, following a series of rapprochements between the super-Powers. Complementary to the rapprochements under way in Europe, such as the signing of the INF Treaty, the conclusion of the Stockholm Document, the continuation of the Vienna talks and the reconvening of the Geneva talks on strategic arms limitation, efforts to bring about peace and security in other parts of the globe are also under way. Endeavours to settle the question of Kampuchea - an issue which constitutes an obstacle to a just and lasting peace and security in the region - are also progressing. We do hope that these positive moves towards peace and security will enhance the prospect of achieving the goal of disarmament, and that these constructive developments will provide the Conference with a timely opportunity to inject fresh resolve into its efforts towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

The issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which is very crucial to the achievement of the goal of disarmament, has been discussed by the Conference on Disarmament since its inception. Regrettably, no sign of success has been observed. Other multilateral forums have also provided viable ways for the international community to address the issue, but again no progress has yet been made. The original parties' aim in concluding the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests was clearly set out among other things in the preambular paragraph of the Treaty, which, inter alia, described

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them as "seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions ... for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances". The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty acceded to it in good faith in the hope that the objective of refraining from testing nuclear weapons would be realized in the near future. Unfortunately, almost 30 years after the signing of the Treaty, it is apparent that nuclear weapon tests are still being conducted.

Despite a widespread belief that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) would prevent the development of new warheads by nuclear-weapon States and increase the pressure on States which have nuclear capabilities not to conduct tests of nuclear weapons, it is being argued that nuclear-weapon States need to be able to develop new systems of nuclear weaponry to maintain the credibility of deterrence. The policy of maintaining such credibility as a corner-stone in the conduct of negotiations, with a CTBT as a long-term goal, would hamper the global efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons once and for all. As a country belonging to the non-aligned movement, Indonesia is not in a position to accept the above-mentioned practice because we would only face annihilation in a nuclear war. This policy could also create the doubt that a CTBT would only be considered when there are no nuclear weapons left.

There is considerable frustration at the moment in the absence of any international forum in which a CTBT can be discussed. The Conference on Disarmament has failed for some years to agree upon a mandate for an ad hoc committee which would consider these issues, as a result of the different positions held by political groupings in the Conference. In the absence of a mandate to negotiate in the CD on this very issue, Indonesia, together with five other countries, namely Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Venezuela, launched an initiative in August 1988 proposing an amendment conference for the PTBT as a way of putting the issue back on the international agenda. My country sees it as an exercise of the right accorded to it by the Treaty, which we faithfully observe, and we continue in our endeavours toward the achievement of the aims set out by the parties on signing the PTBT. In other words, it is an effort to gain momentum in the process toward the materialization of the goal of disarmament in conformity with, and complementary to, the process of rapprochement, negotiation and new developments in the relations among the major Powers.

Sufficient support has been accorded to the initiative, and the depositary States are now required to convene a conference to amend the Partial-Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT). While one of the depositary States has already supported the request, the other two clearly oppose such a move. We sincerely hope that these depositary States will adopt a positive approach and fulfil their obligations and responsibilities by conducting consultations for the preparation and the convening of the conference itself as soon as possible, and hopefully before the fourth NPT review conference in September 1990. Such a sign of good will by the participatory States would be a positive step in the right direction. While it is unrealistic to expect immediate results, hopefully a full and frank discussion would identify difficulties and, in turn, lead to a breakthrough in the CD and allow it to fulfil its task of negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

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The cessation of the nuclear arms race and the aim of nuclear disarmament constitute two of the most crucial issues to be dealt with by the Conference on Disarmament. Paragraph 13 of the Final Document of SSOD-I states that "enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority". Regrettably, these words, which were accepted by consensus by almost all members of the international community during the convening of SSOD-I, have now been cast aside. A number of technological developments and qualitative improvements in nuclear weaponry have overruled the voice of a great number of countries which attempt to contribute to the establishment of international peace and security through nuclear disarmament.

As we approach the end of this decade, it is apparent that the concept of deterrence is still being upheld. For reasons of regional security, the testing and refinement of nuclear weaponry has been and always will be pursued. Today, we are in a paradoxical situation whereby those countries attempting to contribute to the establishment of peace and international security through disarmament are, at the same time, the very same countries carrying out policies based on the deterrence of nuclear weaponry, with the consequences I mentioned earlier.

Nuclear disarmament is, indeed, an extremely lengthy process with meagre visible achievements. It should be understood, moreover, that the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the continuation of nuclear disarmament negotiations cannot be pursued in isolation. An issue of such crucial importance to mankind, which concerns the preservation of our entire civilization, must be the legitimate concern of all States.

The Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be held here in Geneva in September 1990. In view of this important event, we should recall that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have faithfully adhered to its provisions. We would expect the nuclear-weapon States to do likewise, as an indication of their continuing commitment to fulfil their responsibilities. It is being argued that the conclusion of the INF Treaty, as well as other talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons among the super-Powers, indicate their adherence to the Treaty. Article VI and the eighth and twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty stipulated, inter alia, that negotiations would be pursued in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date ultimately to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Bearing in mind the excessive destructive capacity of the existing nuclear arsenals, we are of the view that a cessation of the nuclear arms race should be embarked upon with a full-fledged negotiation on a comprehensive nuclear test ban by all members of the international community. It is our belief that if nuclear disarmament is pursued along these lines, then we will see the concrete materialization of the commitments stipulated in the NPT.

In the establishment of a régime to totally ban chemical weapons, doubts have arisen as to whether the Conference has achieved a tangible result. It has been argued that the plethora of technical details means that more time is

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needed. It could also be argued, however, that the improvement in the international political climate which presents us with a positive momentum should be seen as an opportunity to speed up the conclusion of the régime. A great deal of effort has been directed towards the conclusion of a convention to totally ban chemical weapons. The technical as well as the conceptual details of establishing such a convention have been thoroughly examined during these last few years, and we believe that the establishment of the régime is within our reach. The efforts and dedication of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel, as well as the five Chairmen of the Working Groups, in guiding the work of the Committee deserve our special appreciation. In this regard, my delegation particularly appreciates the initiative to invite experts to give their comments and suggestions to the Committee. This constitutes a useful practice which could enrich our discussions in drafting the convention.

The issue of verification of the convention is of utmost importance for the Committee. We believe that the establishment of a comprehensive and applicable verification régime embodied in the future convention will be the litmus test of the sincerity of States' intentions to remove the chemical weapons they possess. Another element which is no less important is the order of destruction of chemical weapons, as well as their production facilities. A verifiable order of destruction which assures the total elimination and banning of these weapons will be a source of credibility for the future convention. This particular part of the draft convention is in need of a practical and problem-solving approach which takes into account the wish of those who really want to see these horrific weapons banned soon once and for all.

At the last spring session of the Conference, my delegation mentioned that we could only judge the success of the Conference in establishing the régime if, at the end of this summer session, we could see the result of our exercise in treaty language incorporated in the "rolling text". It should be remembered that the international gathering of 149 States in Paris in January of this year resulted in an obligatory mandate to redouble our efforts to conclude the régime at an early date. Technical information suggests that protection against a chemical-weapon attack is nearly impossible in a tropical climate like ours. Recovery from such a catastrophe is also said to be an extremely difficult task. These are only two of the many reasons why Indonesia, as a densely populated tropical country, has as one of its principal disarmament goals a total ban on chemical weapons.

My delegation has an open mind and constructively considers any idea or initiative which would contribute to the goal of totally banning chemical weapons. Any initiative which will enhance endeavours to finalize a global, comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons convention negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament should be supported. Our readiness to positively consider such an initiative also applies to efforts outside the framework of the CD, provided that they would speed up the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention being negotiated in the CD.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Wayarabi for his statement and for his kind words about the presidency.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Hyltenius, representative of Sweden.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): Mr. President, my delegation has already had the opportunity to express its great satisfaction at seeing you presiding over this Conference but before addressing the subject matter of my intervention today, I should like to take this opportunity to express my thanks and best wishes to those colleagues who have left since my delegation last took the floor in the plenary, namely, Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy and Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka. I am very grateful for the excellent co-operation I have enjoyed with all of them and wish them every success in their new responsible positions.

There are several nuclear issues on the agenda of this Conference. It is no coincidence that the question of a nuclear test ban is the first item, and that it attracts the most attention among them. But there are also other nuclear matters which deserve attention and where progress should be possible both in view of international developments and of forthcoming events, and which call for action by the Conference on Disarmament.

The Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is approaching. It is already affecting the work here in the CD and elsewhere in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee in New York last May left the impression that a strong commitment prevailed among the States Parties as regards the need to work for a successful review conference, thereby reinforcing the Treaty and assuring its extension after 1995. As was the case at previous NPT review conferences, there is no doubt that actions, or lack of actions, by the nuclear-weapon States to improve the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States will be closely scrutinized.

What has come out of the obligations laid down in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith in the field of nuclear disarmament? Well, there are positive things to point to - for example, the INF Treaty and the negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. But on the crucial issue of a comprehensive test ban there is still no progress to record.

Today, I should like to address two other nuclear items on our agenda which are of importance in this context, namely, the question of negative security assurances and the issue of radiological weapons. There is no need, in this forum, to give an account of the long history of the question of negative security assurances. Let me just recall the demand, made by non-nuclear-weapon States in the 1960s, during the negotiations on the NPT, for guarantees that they would not be attacked or threatened by nuclear weapons. This demand was turned down, and no such provision was included in the Treaty. The first special session in 1978 marked a certain step forward as all nuclear-weapon States gave unilateral negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States. However, these assurances were not satisfactory from the point of view of the non-nuclear-weapon States. With one exception, they were coupled with restrictions and conditions that significantly reduced their value as a means of strengthening the security of

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the non-nuclear-weapon States. As they were formulated at that time, and as they still stand, they are primarily shaped to suit the security doctrines and the political aims of the nuclear-weapon States themselves.

The subject has been under negotiation in the CD since the late 1970s. As was pointed out in a statement made on behalf of the Group of 21 by the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan on 17 March, its initial promise has petered out and it has been stagnating.

Sweden continues to take an active interest in the issue of negative security assurances pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. My delegation therefore strongly deplores this situation. We consider that this matter is of relevance not only to the general cause of non-proliferation but also to our own national security interests. Military technology, including the development of new and more long-range nuclear and conventional weapon delivery systems, is generating potential new threats to the security of several parts of the world, including the Nordic area. To meet this situation we feel that arrangements should be introduced that could help in building confidence and reasserting control over events in a time of crisis. Unconditional negative security assurances would constitute important measures of this kind. I may add that against the background of the Swedish policy of neutrality we have, however, rejected the idea of relying for our security on so-called positive security assurance, which in our view might place us in a state of dependence and may invite interference from other States.

The most fundamental element of effective negative security assurances is obviously legally binding undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under any circumstances. The obligation on the part of the nuclear-weapon States should in fact be as simple and clear as that. With respect to the legal framework for negative security assurances, Sweden has serious reservations as to the idea of an international convention which would impose further obligations on non-nuclear weapon States. Those States should not be obliged to make any further commitments if, by adhering to the NPT or a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone or in some other legally binding way to be defined, they have undertaken not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

Existing assurances show important differences, which need to be eliminated and replaced by objective criteria to meet the rightful claims to security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The insistence on exceptions is tantamount to trying to justify the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under certain circumstances. I would in this context like to focus on two kinds of exceptions, namely, with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States that either have nuclear weapons on their territories or are involved in a military operation in alliance or association with another nuclear-weapon State. It has been pointed out time and again that such exceptions create considerable ambiguity as to the exact applicability of the assusrances and give room for subjective interpretations by the nuclear-weapon States.

The Final Declaration of the third NPT review conference contains the following statement with regard to work in the CD on negative security assurances:

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"Being aware of the consultations and negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which have been under way in the Conference on Disarmament for several years, the Conference regrets that the search for a common approach which could be included in an international legally binding instrument, has been unsuccessful. The Conference takes note of the repeatedly expressed intention of the Conference on Disarmament to continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work and to carry out negotiations on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this connection, the Conference calls upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to continue the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament devoted to the search for a common approach acceptable to all, which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character."

Time is short if the summing-up in the Final Declaration of the 1990 Review Conference is to list any concrete results achieved, and not only renewed appeals for action. The prerequisites necessary for progress seem to exist: all five nuclear-weapon States are participating in the work of the Ad hoc Committee, and they have recognized the legitimacy of the claims by the non-nuclear-weapon States for negative security assurances. Today old concepts and principles on disarmament and security-related issues are being reviewed and reformulated. The time is now ripe for all the nuclear-weapon States concerned to take the long-awaited step and give effective and binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States under any circumstances.

The second issue I would like to address today is the question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, dealt with by Contact Group B of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. Despite the very able and energetic leadership of the Chairman of the Contact Group, Mr. Gevers of the Netherlands, there are no signs that fundamentally opposing views in key areas are moving closer together.

Let me once again take my starting-point in the Final Declaration of the third NPT review conference, which highlighted the fact that attacks on nuclear facilities could involve grave dangers due to the release of radioactivity. The review conference acknowledged that the matter was under consideration in the Conference on Disarmament and urged the co-operation of all States for a speedy conclusion. Since the adoption of the agenda item on radiological weapons, Sweden has strongly advocated the inclusion of a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities in a forthcoming treaty on radiological weapons in order to give the negotiations a concrete and meaningful objective.

It is not my intention today to give a total overview of the Swedish position on this issue. I shall instead take up a few specific points that were touched upon during the spring session in Contact Group B and in plenary statements. It is the firm belief of my delegation that the main purpose in dealing with this agenda item should be to prohibit mass destruction caused by the emission of radioactivity. The Swedish position has been elaborated with

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the aim of presenting a realistic and feasible approach acceptable to all countries and leading to a global prohibition that would truly reduce the risks of attacks against nuclear facilities.

One could, of course, settle for a more simplistic approach by advocating a treaty that prohibits attacks on any facility that in any respect handles nuclear material. Then, complicated technical discussions on what is really meant by nuclear material would not be necesary, and the concept of the mass destruction criterion could be left out. However, my delegation questions the realism of a prohibition that does not build on the criterion of mass destruction.

During the spring session, the issue of scope was once again in the focus of the debate. Fundamental questions were raised relating to the three alternatives now under debate. Should all attacks on any nuclear facility be prohibited by a treaty of this kind? Should all attacks on nuclear facilities falling under any of the categories covered by the treaty be prohibited? Or should only attacks on nuclear facilities covered by the treaty that actually lead to the spread of radioactive material constitute a violation of the treaty?

As I have just said, Sweden regards the first option as unrealistic. The concepts related to the latter two options are more germane to one another. A prohibition of all attacks on facilities covered by the treaty presupposes sanctuaries or protective zones around the facilities in question. Sweden has in principle no difficulty in agreeing to constituting such areas. However, there are problems with sanctuaries - problems that have been ventilated in our negotiations before. For example, if a power reactor makes a direct contribution to the military effort of an adversary through its electricity supply, it would represent a legitimate military target, according to the international law of war. With the high precision of modern weaponry, the electricity supply could be cut without attacking the reactor itself - that is, virtually without any risk of catastrophic radiological consequences. If a sanctuary were established, either this option would be ruled out or we would instead be faced with a complex question of defining the form and size of sanctuaries, either in a general manner or individually for each plant.

It was against this background that Sweden introduced a proposal on the scope of a treaty that imposes an absolute liability on the part of an attacker to ensure that no attack is carried out in such a manner that catastrophic radiological consequences will follow. A State party to the treaty would have to instruct its military commanders accordingly, e.g. through military manuals.

Sweden's position on this specific issue related to scope is based more on technical considerations than on principle. We are open to suggestions from other delegations on how to solve these problems. I would in this context specifically like to point to document CD/331 of 13 September 1982, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, which partly deals with this issue. As that document points out, the protective zones would for obvious reasons have to be kept free from military installations and other legitimate military targets. Pointing at problems like differing safety standards between States and the fact that some countries have a high density of nuclear

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installations whilst in others they lie scattered far apart or exist only in small numbers, the paper draws the conclusion that "it is a moot point whether protective zones can in fact be established in the near future".

The Swedish delegation agrees that it may be important to prohibit weapons before they are developed and deployed. In fact, entire sectors of a potential arms race have been closed by such agreements. We disagree, however, with those who wish to extend this contention to radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense, because in our view it will not even theoretically be possible to manufacture radiological weapons, not even in the long run. A treaty on radiological weapons limited to "track A" would indeed be a hollow victory for the CD. This would be particularly obvious if at the same time attacks on nuclear facilities - a real danger that exists today and that concerns people - remained outside the prohibition of radiological warfare.

Thus, the urgent task of prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities cannot be seen as a side-issue. Instead, by dealing with this question, the CD has shown its ambition to solve a genuine security problem that many nations face today and are acutely aware of. In the view of my delegation, this ambition can only add to the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament.

The prevention of the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of the utmost importance for security and stability in the world. There are several measures which can be taken to promote that goal. One is, of course, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Another is an agreement on drastic reductions in strategic arsenals. But there are also other measures which can contribute to this end. I have mentioned two of them in my intervention today - improved negative security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States and a meaningful treaty on the prohibition of radiological warfare. It is high time for a determined effort to be made to reach agreement on these items on our agenda too.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak?

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I asked for the floor in order to clear up what appears to be a serious misunderstanding. Our distinguished colleague from Indonesia has indicated, if I understand his statement correctly, and I believe I do, that two depositary States oppose the convening of an amending conference for the limited test-ban Treaty. To my knowledge, this is not the case. The requisite number of parties having requested such a conference, the United States is willingly carrying out its duties as a depositary State. We have notified all States parties of the intention of the depositaries to hold such a conference and we are consulting with the other depositary States regarding such a conference. There certainly should be no question that we will properly fulfil the duties incumbent upon a depositary of the limited test-ban Treaty.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom): As one of the depositaries of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, perhaps I should also say a few words. I think there is an obvious distinction between the national policy of any State and the responsibilities of a depositary Power. As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, we have made clear our very considerable reservations about the wisdom of the call for a conference to amend the Partial Test-Ban Treaty in order to make it into a comprehensive test ban. But, as a depositary Power, we have also made clear that we intend to carry out our responsibilities fully as a depositary Power and, indeed, as we have just heard, all three depositary Powers have already taken a number of steps in that direction. Perhaps I could add that - it is my personal feeling - what the distinguished deputy leader of the delegation of Indonesia said, I think, is not inconsistent with that distinction I have just made, but, just in case there were any grounds for misunderstanding, I thought it as well to make our position clear.

The PRESIDENT: I suggest that we should now consider Ghana's request to participate in the plenary Conference and in the subsidiary organs set up on agenda items 4, 6 and 8. Ghana's note was circulated at the beginning of last week, and there have not been any comments from members. That being the case, we could take a decision on the request without needing to convene an informal meeting, on the understanding that we are not selling a precedent for the future.

I invite the Conference to consider the draft decision in document CD/WP.368 concerning the request by Ghana. If there is no objection, I shall consider it adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Members of the Conference will remember that at the plenary meeting on 13 June last, the secretariat circulated a communication from the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. In his communication, he refers to paragraph 23 of the Committee's report, in which "recalling the request in the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty with respect to article V, the Preparatory Committee decided to invite the Conference on Disarmament to proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. In this connection, the Preparatory Committee decided to request the Conference on Disarmament to enable States parties not members of the Conference on Disarmament to participate in this consideration in accordance with the rules of procedure".

From consultations with members, there seems to be a consensus that the Conference should consider this matter at an informal meeting to be held on Tuesday, 18 July, immediately after the plenary meeting, on the understanding that if the debate is not concluded on that occasion it will continue at another informal meeting on Thursday, 20 July, again after that day's plenary meeting.

(The President)

If there are no comments, I shall take it that the Conference agrees with the proposed procedure.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As regards the participation of States parties to the Treaty which are not members of the Conference, the secretariat will inform them in writing of the decision taken today, so that they can if they wish submit requests to participate, by 11 July next at the latest. These requests will be considered by the Conference in accordance with its rules of procedure.

I should now like to refer to the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary organs next week. The timetable has been prepared after consultation with my successor and the Chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees. As always, it is merely indicative and can be modified as necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In a few moments I am going to adjourn the 513th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, the sixth and last we have held in the month of June 1989.

As I do so, I think it is a good opportunity to remind you once again that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration of 1985, urged all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as a matter of the highest priority, in this Conference on Disarmament.

I should also like to draw attention, so that we may bear it very much in mind during the remaining two months of the 1989 session, to the "firm intention" at which the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament arrived last year and which is stated in its report to the General Assembly, of completing the preparation of the Programme "for its submission to the General Assembly, at the latest, at its forty-fourth session". I hope that we can achieve this honourable goal.

The next plenary meeting of the Disarmament Conference will be held on Tuesday, 4 July, at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.514
4 July 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 4 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

GE.89-61713/0716B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 514th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the outset, may I extend to the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - on the Conference's and my own behalf - our sincere condolences on the passing away of His Excellency Andrei Gromyko, former Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Minister for Foreign Affairs, a distinguished statesman who had remarkable influence on developments during the post-war period, and made outstanding personal contributions to the maintenance of peace and international security. He participated in the opening meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the predecessor of this Conference, on 14 March 1962, and was closely involved in the most important issues of disarmament. Allow me also to request the Soviet delegation to convey to its Government and the family of the deceased our sympathy in such trying circumstances.

I should like now to extend a warm welcome in the Conference to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, who will be the first speaker at this plenary meeting. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is well known to all of us, since he has periodically visited the Conference to present the views of his Government on subjects on our agenda. His interest in our work led him to preside over the Conference at the opening meeting of the Iranian presidency on 1 September 1988.

I wish also to extend warm thanks, on behalf of the Conference, to Ambassador García Robles of Mexico for his effective and able presidency during the month of June, the responsibilities of which he discharged for the second time during his tenure as representative of Mexico to the Conference. His experience as dean of the representatives to the Conference and his diplomatic competence and skill were determinant elements in the success of his presidency.

Before continuing with our business for today, allow me, distinguished delegates, to make a brief opening statement in my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July.

Exactly 20 years ago, at the first 1969 meeting of the enlarged Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament - the predecessor of our Conference - my country, the Mongolian People's Republic, began to participate in the work of this sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. By coincidence, on the anniversary of our 20 years' participation, I have the great honour and privilege of presiding over the Conference on Disarmament. The statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic on 2 July 1969 pointed out that Mongolia, as a member of the then Committee on Disarmament, would spare no efforts to strengthen universal peace and security by promoting the implementation of effective disarmament measures and patiently exploring ways and means of bringing the various positions closer together. Today, we reaffirm that my country remains true to what it pledged on the day of its admission to this highly important disarmament negotiating body.

(The President)

In assuming the presidency of the Conference for the month of July, I should like to assure you that with your co-operation and kind assistance I shall do my best to accomplish the tasks before the Conference.

In view of the positive international developments which have taken place in the past few years, the Conference on Disarmament is duty-bound to intensify its work on a number of issues before it. In that connection, I wish to recall the importance of the efforts undertaken by the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada, in his consultations to develop an organizational arrangement for agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban". I would venture to say that Ambassador Yamada has gone a long way towards reconciling all positions. I am sure that we can count on the co-operation of all members to bring the consultations to a positive conclusion, and I should like to invite Ambassador Yamada to continue his dialogue with the item "Co-ordinators and other delegations". I remain available, of course, to assist in those consultations. I intend also to continue the consultations to find appropriate organizational frameworks to deal with items 2, 3 and 7 of our agenda, namely, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", and "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new sytems of such weapons". With regard to other items of the agenda where the Conference has established subsidiary organs, I wish to draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that July is a demanding period of substantive work before we all proceed to the drafting of our annual report. Hence, I ask the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees to do their utmost to intensify the work on substance in their respective Committees during this part of the session. We should also not lose sight of the need to continue our consideration of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, as well as of the question of expansion of its membership. I will pursue consultations on these important topics with the group Co-ordinators.

I wish to recall also that, on 18 July, the Conference will hold an informal meeting to consider further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. This informal meeting will continue on 20 July if additional delegations would like to express views at the end of the first discussion devoted to the matter. Invitations to States parties non-members of the Conference are now being sent out by the Secretariat.

That concludes my opening statement.

I should like now to proceed to other business. The Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the German Democratic Republic.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati.

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, at the outset, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. I assure you of my delegation's full co-operation with you and other members of the Bureau.

In recent years, it has been a pleasure for me to present the views of my Government in this august body. This is a commitment which stems from our belief that international peace and security can be enhanced only through reduction and elimination of the causes of insecurity, namely, armaments and belligerency. The Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors were founded to fulfil humanity's resolve to prevent wars after the bitter experience of the two world wars. My country's special commitment to disarmament is also rooted in the experience of our people during the war of aggression waged against us by our neighbour and its collaborators. We share the experience of the victims of world wars and thus share their belief in the necessity of peace and disarmament.

The year 1988 marked rising hopes and expectations throughout the world both in the field of disarmament and resolution of conflicts, with the ratification of the treaty for elimination of a category of nuclear weapons, the establishment of a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and sustained efforts to bring to an end debilitating regional conflicts in southern Africa and Indo-China.

In 1989, however, the momentum has not been kept up and prospects are not bright and encouraging. In the field of conflict resolution, almost one year has elapsed since the establishment of a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, and other provisions of Security Council resolution 598 adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter remain unimplemented. Even withdrawal to the internationally recognized boundaries ordered by the Council along with a cease-fire as a mandatory "first step towards a negotiated settlement" has not yet materialized, and Iraq continues to occupy, in defiance of Security Council resolution 598 and international law, more than 2,000 square kilometres of Iranian territory. The failure of Iraq to comply with the most prominent provision of resolution 598 has escalated tension. The Security Council shoulders great responsibility not only to ensure compliance with resolution 598 as called for under paragraph 10 of the resolution, but also in its capacity as the primary organ of the United Nations charged with maintenance of international peace and security.

The process of disarmament has undergone a period of resurgence in recent years. Indeed, the disappointment and scepticism that had relegated arms control to the back-burner of international politics in the early 1980s has been replaced by public optimism and even a small dose of euphoria. This development has led to, and is fuelled by, the first nuclear arms elimination agreement in the history of mankind, namely, the INF Treaty. Other agreements such as the Stockholm Accord, an offspring of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), or the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres by the two super-Powers underline the new dynamic in arms control. The expression of satisfaction over the conclusion of the INF Treaty was a reflection of an earnest hope for immediate realization of more substantial

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achievements in the field of disarmament. Because INF by itself, even if implemented completely, will only eliminate up to 4 per cent of the present nuclear arsenals. Here, I wish to express concern arising from talks about modernization of nuclear weapons as well as strenghtening of conventional forces.

One of the most significant items on the agenda of this negotiating body is the elimination of chemical weapons. The horrors of chemical warfare were hardly remembered in 1980. Yet, the 1980s became a turning point in the banalization of chemical weapons and their treatment as conventional ones. The almost unabated and indiscriminate use of these weapons of mass destruction by Iraq in the course of its war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran added yet another frightening dimension; that is, even this despicable method of warfare and genocide can be employed almost with impunity in a world dominated by political expediency. Repeated warnings by the Islamic Republic of Iran, reports by international mass media, and even eight reports produced by United Nations teams of experts did not create any genuine reaction by the international diplomatic community, or even the States parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. And in this atmosphere of silence and acquiescence, the world witnessed a quantitative and qualitative intensification of chemical warfare by Iraq.

Chemical warfare started with sporadic use of chemical weapons in limited areas and developed into a regular method of warfare. The victims, who in 1981 were a limited number of Iranian soldiers, grew in numbers, and finally engulfed innocent Iranian civilians in Sardasht. The emotional report of United Nations specialists witnessing the martyrdom of chemically wounded children did not move the custodians of international peace, security, law and human rights. Had they reacted differently, the Iraqi régime might have been deterred from resorting to such a massive chemical attack in its genocide in Halabja. The chemical agent with which Iraq started its chemical warfare was simple mustard gas. However, they gradually moved on to technologically sophisticated nerve gas and agents such as Sarin and Suman. This development is not only significant because of the vast difference in toxicity, but also because of the significant change in the required technology. Sarin cannot be produced with the normal equipment of pesticide plants. It is evident, therefore, that the technology for the production of these agents was supplied to Iraq, regrettably, in the course of the war and certainly after the Iraqi policy of chemical warfare had become public knowledge.

The delivery system of chemical weapons had an even more dramatic development. According to the report of the United Nations team, in 1984, the delivery system was so imperfect that many of the chemical bombs did not even operate. By 1986, this shortcoming had already been overcome. In addition, spray tanks, and more importantly surface-to-surface missiles carrying chemical agents, were introduced, once again proving the complicity of others in the criminal development of the Iraqi chemical war machine.

The Halabja chemical massacre shocked international public opinion and created the expectation that effective measures would be taken in order to reverse the conventional approach of indiscriminate use of chemical weapons. Against this background, and following the establishment of a cease-fire

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between Iran and Iraq, the Paris Conference was announced. But in a bid to pre-empt any action against the culprit, the Iraqi Foreign Minister in an interview with a Kuwaiti paper on the eve of the Conference threatened that he would reveal the names of European suppliers of chemical agents and technology to Iraq, if those countries persisted in their pressure against Iraq. The blackmail was so effective that the Conference did not even name the culprit. It is, therefore, not surprising to see that although the Paris Conference called on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts for the speedy conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons, no agreement has been reached in CD even for minor improvements such as changing the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee to add "prohibition of use" in the title of the convention being negotiated.

What is really needed for the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive, global and effectively verifiable convention is a strong political will by all parties. Our collective efforts should be directed towards total and absolute elimination of chemical weapons through the early conclusion of a convention enjoying universal adherence. Interim measures such as non-proliferation of chemical weapons will not serve the objective of abolishing chemical weapons and preventing their use. In this connection, the order of destruction envisaged in the convention should include qualitative and quantitative aspects of these weapons. The order of destruction should give priority to destruction of the most lethal ones such as nerve gas, and not start with mustard gas, which because of its obsoleteness will have to be destroyed sooner or later. The big Powers should prove their genuine will by acting indiscriminately in this direction. The Canberra Conference should also refrain from acting towards non-proliferation of chemical weapons, since that will adversely affect the work of our Conference in Geneva. In order to ensure the universality of the convention, it is necessary to provide incentives, and in this respect article 10 plays a key role. Assistance to victims of chemical weapons should be automatic and mandatory, because any delay in providing assistance such as antidotes, medical care and first aid would cost human lives. Another area which still needs to be specified is punitive measures against States parties which may breach the convention.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that it is of paramount importance for international peace and security to free the Middle East from nuclear arsenals. The General Assembly has, every year, called for the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. However, the Zionist entity, which has developed its nuclear capability in collaboration with South Africa and certain Western Powers remains an obstacle for the realization of the common objective of the people of this region.

The Indian Ocean and its natural extensions should also be free from nuclear weapons and from the rivalry of outside Powers. The attack on an Iranian civil airliner exactly a year ago, as well as other acts of aggression by the United States fleet in the Persian Gulf against the Islamic Republic of Iran, are sad manifestations of a foreign presence in our important region. The security of the Persian Gulf is the sole responsibility of the littoral States, and foreign navies, which have brought nothing but disaster and insecurity, should abandon their self-assigned role as policemen of the region.

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The mandate of the Conference on Disarmament includes adoption of effective international measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. But so far, there has been no progress in arriving at a legally binding common and substantive negative security assurance of a global nature. The Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurance has not been able to reach any common ground in its worthy objective. This situation may give rise to a perception that by signing the NPT, countries have left themselves without protection against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In fact, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have honoured their obligation, while the nuclear-weapon States have failed to fulfil their commitments. The consequence is the current race to obtain nuclear weapons capability by semi-developed States, with all its adverse social and economic effects on these States.

The realization of the lofty and vital objectives for which this Conference was established requires more political will, insight and multilateral efforts and less double standards and political expediency. The destiny of mankind, which is increasingly threatened by these inhuman weapons of mass destruction, requires no less.

The PRESIDENT: I thank his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his important statement and for the kind words that he addressed to the Presidency. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): At the very outset, I should like to join others in expressing our deep condolences to the Soviet delegation on the passing away of Andrei Andreevich Gromyko.

Sir, allow me to congratulate you upon your assumption of your high office. I do this with particular pleasure as you represeent a country with which the German Democratic Republic, throughout its existence, has enjoyed close and friendly relations. Your accession as President of the Conference reflects the active part Mongolia is playing in the development of peaceful international co-operation between States. Your accession to this post also mirrors the personal commitment you display in the quest for arms limitation and disarmament. Highly valued are your determined efforts, as Chairman of the Outer Space Committee, to make headway in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I wish you much success in the discharge of your responsible duties and can assure you of my delegation's fullest support in this endeavour.

Having the floor, let me also take this opportunity to commend the former President, Ambassador García Robles, your predecessor. I think he deserves our appreciation and gratitude for his competence and special negotiating skills, which helped create the necessary conditions for resuming the work of our Conference.

At today's plenary debate, the prevention of an arms race in outer space is at issue. This problem justifiably occupies a central place in our work. The commitment to the pursuit of peace makes it necessary to end the arms race on earth and to prevent it from spilling over into outer space. The recently resumed Soviet-American negotiations must for our point of view make a

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contribution to this end - while strictly adhering to the ABM Treaty as it was signed in 1972. We, too, have to pull our weight in order that the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space may be achieved. For eight years now the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The Outer Space Committee established for this purpose has been dealing with this question for almost five years. A good many efforts have been undertaken to get things going. A quite considerable number of proposals are on the table. We all know of the problems which urgently call for a solution. We feel that it is time to get down to business notwithstanding all the obstacles, i.e. to set about concrete work with regard to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The German Democratic Republic is in favour of concluding effective and verifiable agreements on the prohibition of the development, testing and deployment of weapons in space. No doubt there do exist reservations, and differences on the roads to be followed to this end have not been bridged. But should this hinder us from fully harnessing the potential for agreement and searching for a step-by-step solution to the existing problems?

The consideration of confidence-building measures, in our view, offers the chance to impart strong momentum to the Outer Space Committee. We think that it would serve confidence-building if the international exchange of information was expanded. The concrete discussion of the proposal advanced by France concerning the "code of conduct" and that of the Federal Republic of Germany regarding the "rules of the road" would also help build confidence. What is of interest, in our opinion, is Poland's idea of considering a separate protocol to be appended to the 1975 Convention on Registration providing for the extension of data exchange and ad hoc inspections of announced launches into outer space. The German Democratic Republic also endorses the appeal made by Argentina to all States to declare whether they have any weapons deployed in outer space. The implementation of the Soviet proposal concerning the establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space would eventually constitute a significant confidence-building measure from our point of view. In so doing, it would, in fact, be possible to forestall the introduction of important categories of weapons in space as well as their components. In our opinion, such confidence-building measures augur well for bringing about mutually acceptable agreements.

It is along these lines that the German Democratic Republic and the Mongolian People's Republic tabled in 1987 a document containing the main provisions for a treaty on the prohibition of antisatellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects. To follow up this initiative, I should like to submit today a proposal specifying ASAT components and ways of verifying their prohibition. Here we are drawing on the debate so far conducted concerning ASAT weapons. In this context, I especially have in mind the suggestions made by Sweden, and I also have in mind the proposal advanced by India, with respect to an outline of an agreement that would commit all States not to develop, produce or acquire, test or deploy ASAT weapons.

The document before us, which was presented by my delegation, document CD/927, "ASAT components and ways of verifying their prohibition", comments on the problems of definition and categorization of ASAT weapons. At the same time, it indicates possibilities for effective verification of

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future agreements. This proposal stems from the fact that the technological development of so-called conventional ASAT weapons is highly advanced and the prohibition of these weapons is of particular urgency. For this reason, document CD/927 deals with important categories of that group of ASAT systems, such as: space-based chemical rockets and mass accelerators; ground-based chemical rockets and mass accelerators; and space mines and collision bodies. We believe that the considerations pinpointed in this paper could help advance the discussion of: the kinds of space weapons or components; the measures required to prevent such weapons; the description of the weapons and their stage of development; and the type of verification. These are undoubtedly comprehensive and complex issues, for the discussion of which the involvement of scientific experts from our point of view is imperative. The proposals for setting up an expert group to look into relevant scientific and technological questions will therefore receive our unqualified support also in future.

For a long time the pros and cons of international organizations and institutions have been deliberated which could help verify compliance with disarmament accords by means of outer space technology. We think that the Soviet initiative on the setting up of an international space inspectorate, the Canadian PAXSAT concept, the French proposal on the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency and the proposal of the USSR to establish a world space organization deserve to be discussed in depth with the aim that an overall structure be finally created.

At this juncture, let me refer to the proposal for joint European satellite observation, which is contained in the joint initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic and the Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany for the creation of a zone of confidence and security in Central Europe. It is likely that it could form part of an international satellite monitoring agency. Interesting in this context would, finally, be the ideas advanced by the United Nations Secretary-General in terms of a multilateral international alert system.

After all, it is obvious that there is indeed no lack of substance in the work of the Outer Space Committee. As for the agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" our delegation deems it important that the gap between general debates and a more structured and intensive work be bridged. We feel that substantive discussions leading us to negotiations should be started in fields where common ground could probably be found. Political will and readiness for compromise, together with an accommodating approach by all parties, are certainly required in this endeavour. My delegation is prepared to make a distinctive contribution to this effect.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the cordial words he has addressed to me and to my country.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Thank you, Comrade President. The Soviet delegation will have another opportunity, when it makes its planned statement shortly, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference, and also to thank Ambassador García Robles, who was President of the Conference in June. I have asked for the floor today to express our gratitude to you, Comrade President, and to all the distinguished delegates who have offered us their condolences on the death of Andrei Andreevich Gromyko. We will pass these words of sympathy on to Moscow.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. Are there any other speakers? That does not seem to be the case. That concludes our business for today. I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 6 July at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.515
6 July 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

GE.89-61783/0724B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 515th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I should like to extend a cordial welcome to the participants in the United Nations programme of fellowships, training programmes and advisory services on disarmament who are attending this plenary meeting today. As you know, the first part of the programme is being held in Geneva, and the participants are invited to visit some countries which are members of the Conference, the United Nations Office at Vienna and United Nations Headquarters in New York. I should like to wish all the participants success in their studies here in Geneva, during which various members of the Conference on Disarmament will be giving them an account of current disarmament problems.

The Conference will today continue its consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Hungary and Peru. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Varga.

Mr. VARGA (Hungary): Mr. President, speaking for the first time during your tenure of office, I offer my congratulations to you on your succession to the presidency for the month of July. I wish you the best of success in discharging your responsible duties. I also express the appreciation of my delegation to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador García Robles, who guided the proceedings of this body in June with wisdom and professional skill. The Conference on Disarmament has profited a great deal from his vast experience and prestige in multilateral disarmament. I also extend a hearty welcome to our new colleague, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov, the new head of the delegation of the USSR. My delegation will continue its close co-operation with him as we did with his distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Youri Nazarkin, to whom I wish the best of succes in discharging his new responsibilities. I take this opportunity to bid arewell to our distinguished colleagues Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Pugliese of Ialy and Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina and wish them all the best in their future careers.

The Conference on Disarmament has resumed its work under a continuing auspicious international climate. Events which have taken place since the closure of our spring session testify to a growing awareness - particularly in Europe - that results achieved in the field of political co-operation should be reinforced with tangible results in disarmament. The proposals put forward by the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization augur well for a speedy and fruitful outcome of the Vienna negotiations. The proposals put forward by the two sides come close together concerning the radical cuts in the conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe. It shows not only a genuine desire to achieve an agreement but also holds out excellent chances of success. We hope that will be the case in the foreseeable future, perhaps within the time-frame suggested.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

The Conference on Disarmament has its own share to contribute to the positive general trend in world events. Negotiations on the comprehensive and total ban of all chemical weapons are definitely one of the areas where the Conference on Disarmament is in a position to make a significant step. The work resumed in the five working groups under the dynamic guidance of Ambassador Morel, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, in the view of my delegation, should be directed towards the solution of the remaining problems which have been identified so far, and the agreements achieved should be fixed in the rolling text. When I speak about the remaining problems, I mean those of considerable political importance. The five working groups in our view should give their attention to resolving the problems which may facilitate the earliest completion of the convention on the global ban of all chemical weapons.

My delegation considers that the Conference has done useful work with the accomplishment of quite a number of national trial inspections. The practical experience gained and the conclusions drawn will facilitate the final elaboration of the verification system of the future convention. I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to the Swedish delegation for the excellent work it has accomplished.

While in Geneva the Conference on Disarmament is engaged in the negotations on a chemical weapons ban and an increased significance is attached to the problems of verification, a number of countries are busy in their efforts aimed at contributing to the solution of that key issue.

Hungary was one of the first to conduct a national trial inspection late last year. As declared on several occasions Hungary does not possess chemical weapons, nor an industrial establishment for their production. It does not conduct any sort of research on chemical weapons, nor does it intend to acquire such weapons in the future. Furthermore no other country stores any kind of chemical weapons or conducts any kind of related activity on the territory of Hungary. Our participation in trial inspections serves purely political purposes: to promote negotiations and help create mutual confidence.

The objectives of the first trial inspection were limited: to provide opportunities for a Hungarian team to learn and practise the basics of inspection. In view of the favourable expereience gained, and the desire to maintain the momentum of the negotiations in Geneva, we think it useful to give consideration to following up - at the appropriate time - the national trial inspections by different types of multilateral activities including multilateral verification experiments.

Another area of vital importance, where it is absolutely essential for the Conference on Disarmament to make definite progress, is the issue of nuclear disarmament. During the spring session Ambassador Yamada of Japan generated momentum for the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban. My delegation fully supports his efforts and sincerely hopes that Ambassador Yamada will soon succeed in overcoming the remaining difficulties - in practical terms, a couple of disputed words - and that the Ad Hoc Committee

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will be able to start practical work still during this session. In view of the forthcoming Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty the importance of such a development could hardly be overestimated.

In my today' statement I wold like to dwell on the issue of the prohibition of radiological weapons in some detail. This may also be considered an area where the Conference on Disarmament could achieve tangible results within a comparatively short period. That would have a significance of its own even if the issue may not be considered by some a high-priority task.

My delegation has traditionally taken particular interest in this subject and has been doing its utmost to make its contribution. I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador de Rivero of Peru, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, for his efforts to maintain the momentum of the negotiations.

The value of the subject for arms control and disarmament has also given rise to lengthy debate in relation to the prohibition of radiological weapons "proper" or "in the traditional sense", as well as the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. In the bulky material accumulated during the last decade various arguments have been put forward for or against various aspects of the question. Taking stock of this discussion, it can be concluded that there is a general consensus that radiological weapons should be banned irrespective of the fact that such weapons may not be in existence. One may trace also an "almost-consensus" that appropriate international measures are warranted on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

I prefer to refrain from going into details on the arguments I was referring to a minute ago. However I would like to amplify an aspect rarely mentioned so far. Apart from the value of the subjects for disarmament and arms control - which my delegation thinks is there - the prohibition of radiological weapons and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities can be regarded also as global, world-wide confidence-building measures. Practical experience shows the vital importance of appropriate confidence-building measures as indispensable steps to prepare the basis for more far-reaching disarmament measures. What adds to this importance is that in one way or another both tracks are concerned with particular aspects of nuclear activities. Results in this area would be of considerable political importance in view of the forthcoming 4th Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The non-proliferation régime is worth preserving and strengthening. This can be achieved through a series of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, working out appropriate collateral measures - such as the ones under consideration - could also have a beneficial effect, especially if we consider the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

Since 1979 an enormous amount of work, of intellectual and professional input, has been invested in the negotiations on the subject. One cannot but pay respect to the work accomplished and wish to maintain and use the results achieved so far. Being aware of the difficulties encountered in the substance

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and in the way of handling the two aspects of the issue, the Conference on Disarmament recommended in 1986 that "the ways and means of how best to proceed further" should be considered by the subsidiary body dealing with the matter. By implementing that decision and following a new working method it has created a good textual basis for work in relation to both tracks. We hope that developments in the Ad Hoc Committee and in the contact groups on tracks "A" and "B" will prove that this way of proceeding is feasible.

The "rolling texts" drawn up on tracks "A" and "B" respectively contain most of the basic elements required for the elaboration of the final text. Whatever is still missing can easily be recovered from documents containing the results of previous consideration of the issue. The method of drawing up alternatives in relation to particular central issues has the advantage of clearly showing the different approaches to the subject matter and also indicates the possibilities for resolving them.

Looking into the matter in a more concrete manner one comes to the conclusion that the major stumbling block in both tracks is that no agreed solution has been found for the scope of prohibition. It comes as no surprise that because of this a number of other main elements, including the question of verification, are hard to settle. In a way this is a reflection or the "fall out" of the unresolved questions on the scope.

The possibility of any further move therefore - in our view - depends on whether or not the issue of the scope of prohibition can be finally settled. Assessing the negotiations carried on in the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, my delegation considers that an adequate amount of material has been accumulated in connection with the elements on the scope of prohibition of both tracks "A" and "B". The elements which could be included into the scope of the future instrument or instruments appear at present in the form of alternatives. At an appropriate stage of negotiations it becomes inevitable to start drawing up a single formulation for the scope of both subject matters. The working paper, an advance copy of which has been distributed today under the symbol CD/928, represents an attempt - for purposes of illustration - to suggest a practical solution for working out a single formulation for the scope of tracks "A" and "B" respectively, based on the elements appearing in the working documents under consideration in the contact groups of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons.

As far as track "A" or "radiological weapons proper" is concerned, two distinct approaches can be identified, which - fortunately - are far from being irreconcilable, much less mutually exclusive. One of them, the one proposed by the original authors, advocates the prohibition of radiological weapons as such and subsequently the prohibiton of the hostile use of radioactive material. The proposal is supplemented by an appropriate definition on the radiological weapons, incidentally giving rise to prolonged controversies. The alternative approach calls only for the prohibition of the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes. This approach calls into question the military feasibility of radiological weapons as such and holds the definition of radiological weapons unnecessary and ambiguous.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

The common feature in the two approaches is that both of them recognize the necessity of the prohibition of the use of radioacative material for hostile purposes. This common feature perhaps can be used as a basis for designing a scope which could amalgamate the substance of the two conceptions. Once there is agreement in principle that the hostile use of radioactive material is prohibited, it follows logically that the military hardware specifically designed for the use of radioactive material for hostile purposes shold also be banned. It is equally logical, further, that the production, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of radioactive material specifically prepared, configured or designed for use for hostile purposes should also be banned.

My delegation is aware of the fact that such an approach involves a certain change in the original positions. But in order to achieve a change something has to be changed.

Turning to track "B", the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, I would like to say as an introduction that it has become during the last years an independent subject in its own right, thanks to the idea originally introduced into the proceedings by the Swedish delegation.

Addressing myself to the issue I would like to start from the fact that the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 already offered some protection to nuclear facilities, saying in paragraph 1 of Article 56 that installations containing dangerous forces such as nuclear generating stations "shall not be made the object of attack even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among civilian population". This general prohibition is weakened however with considerable numbers of restrictions.

The question may be raised whether or not further international legal protection is called for in relation to nuclear facilities. The nuclear industry has gone a long way since 1949. And here I would like to highlight somewhat an aspect that has comparatively seldom been referred to in our proceedings. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency adopted in 1986 in the framework of the IAEA were worked out in practically no time after the Chernobyl catastrophe. The spirit of the two conventions suggests that States are indeed aware of the dangers of nuclear accidents which may result in an international transboundary release of radioactive material that could be of significance with regard to radiological safety for other States also. It is evident that these States do not desire man-made nuclear accidents, since they strive to prevent or avoid the consequences of those caused by the caprices of technology. Further elaboration of this idea is hardly necessary.

Returning to the subject matter after this short historical review, I would like to say that the conventions referred to above may have a practical value for our negotiations together with the message their basic spirit conveys to us.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

Contact Group "B" of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has also succeeded in accumulating a considerable amount of material on the possible elements relevant to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. However - as was the case with track "A" also - the positions cluster around two distinct but contradictory approaches, which differ from each other in quantitative and qualitative terms. The approach based on the so-called "mass destruction criteria" stresses the avoidance of the release and dissemination of radioactive material and would apply the prohibition of attack to a relatively narrow range of facilities specified according to technical specifications dealt with in the sections on Definitions and Criteria. The other, occasionally referred to as the "sanctuary approach", stresses the "non-attack" aspect and applies the prohibition of attack to a broader, or unlimited range of facilities.

To work out a common approach - in our view - poses a twofold task. The first is basically of a political nature, to devise an appropriate combination of the non-attack clause and the avoidance of the release of radioactive material. The second, and more technical one, is to describe and define the facilities to which the scope will be applied. The latter involves deep professional understanding of the related nuclear technologies and of the potential dangers involved in practical terms. The heart of the matter is anyway the issue of the scope. The version suggested in our working paper illustrates the way of thinking I was describing above. At this stage my delegation is not putting forward any suggestions as to the second part of the task in view of the difficulties mentioned.

Closing my statement, I would like to emphasize that at the present and forthcoming stages in the negotiations it is indispensable to make efforts to reconcile the differing approaches, which are clearly visible. An agreement on the scope would definitely facilitate the harmonization of positions on other main elements too. If a realistic, consensus-based approach could be worked out, it might help convince also those who at this stage may have reservations on the issues as such.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru, Mr. Calderón.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Allow me to address my first words, Sir, to you, to express the pleasure with which we see you in the Chair. You can be assured that you will find my delegation ready in every way to contribute to the success of our work. Likewise, I should like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Alfonso García Robles for the admirable way in which he conducted the work of this sole multilateral negotiating forum in June. Ambassador García Robles, who has close links with Peru, is an eminent figure in the area of disarmament and his tireless devotion to this work is for us a daily challenge and an outstanding example. This is a good opportunity for my delegation to convey its best wishes to the distinguished Ambassadors of Sri Lanka, Mr. Rodrigo, of Italy, Mr. Pugliese, and of Argentina, Mr. Cámpora, who we hope will come back to us soon, if only for a while.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

I should like to refer first of all to agenda item 7. As was stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, Mr. Guillermo Larco Cox, in the statement he made to the Conference on 25 April this year, "the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities could be dealt with in a brief, forceful agreement of a basically political nature". It is therefore fully consistent with this position of my country that today I have pleasure in introducing a draft convention on the subject. Aware as my delegation is of the series of implications of a political and technical nature that are involved in the negotiation of a convention of this type, we are not claiming that with this draft convention we shall resolve the disputes that have arisen over the last six years, nor do we think that we have taken care satisfactorily of all the different facets of the positions adopted in this body. But we do seek to put forward a new approach in dealing with this major question of attacks on nuclear facilities, guided by the conviction that through the political will of the States represented here we could reach agreement on this subject within a short space of time.

When you try to prohibit attacks on nuclear facilities, what you are seeking to do is to ban a type of act of aggression that has the particular characteristics of entailing an additional risk of the possible release of radioactivity to the detriment of neighbouring populations and the environment. In other words, what we want to do is to single out attacks on nuclear facilities, precisely because of the additional threat they pose, and I say additional threat because it is not, of course, a fact that in all cases this would produce indiscriminate release of radioactivity. If we sought to focus our attention solely and exclusively on those attacks against nuclear facilities that would produce an effect of mass destruction, then by interpretation a contrario we should have to accept discrimination amongst attacks on nuclear facilities, which is quite unacceptable from the standpoint of international law. Indeed, it would be paradoxical if an attack on a nuclear facility of 0.5 megawatts were to be outside the scope of the future convention, despite the flagrant violation of international law and the serious harm that this attack could cause the country attacked, merely on the grounds that the radioactivity released had not reached the required number of becquerels. The point is that this question of attacks on nuclear facilities cannot be considered in isolation from the principles clearly and categorically established in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, concerning the obligation of Member States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or legal independence of any State or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. This basic rule, which falls within the category of jus cogens, does not allow us to differentiate between acts of aggression, because that might endanger its full effectiveness. The only reason which justifies singling out attacks on nuclear facilities as compared with other acts of aggression is the latent risk of the spread of radioactivity, with possible implications of mass destruction. But from the legal point of view there is absolutely no basis for differentiating between attacks on nuclear facilities, unless what we are trying to do is not to have a universal type of convention but rather a partial and localized one for highly populated areas or for countries with a large number of reactors and nuclear facilities.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Now if what would allow us to single out attacks on nuclear facilities from the rest is the risk or threat, and not the actual or imminent fact, of causing an uncontrolled release of radioactive material, another problem raised by the experts is whether one can differentiate between nuclear facilities that are designed for military purposes and those designed for peaceful purposes. It should at least be borne in mind that alpha, beta and gamma rays do not differentiate between persons or things, and once out of the plant they are just as harmful whatever they were made for. To paraphrase what was once said by General Gallois, this is a reflection of the equalizing power of the atom or in other terms, it is an indication of the fatefully egalitarian nature of nuclear fission: even if it was originally devised for the opposite purpose, once nuclear fission is out of control, it is equally harmful for man and his environment. Despite what I have said, we have to agree that it is not easy to draw a line between military and non-military uses of nuclear facilities, especially if we bear in mind that the use may be either direct or indirect, but it is not indispensable or obligatory for us to decide this question. To tell the truth, it is perfectly possible to draw up the convention without going into this problem. In the end what we have to do is to exclude once and for all the risk or threat that could menace defenceless people if acts of aggression were directed at nuclear facilities.

Another problem that sometimes complicates our handling of this question is whether in the planned convention the emphasis should be on safeguarding installations in time of peace or in time of war. Now strictly speaking, what we are trying to do is to ban attacks on nuclear facilities at any time and in any place. It is, of course, legitimate that there should be additional concern when the possibility of attack arises in time of war. Nevertheless, this would be something incidental or contingent, which should certainly not be shirked by the future convention, but has no reason whatever to be regarded as the decisive element. What is essential is to prohibit those acts of aggression, which do not always occur in wartime. What is more, they are likely to occur in a situation other than open conflict, as happened a few years ago. So if what is wanted is a universal convention, serving everyone's interests, it will have to establish general rules rather than exceptions. In the case of war, what we have to try to achieve with this comprehensive prohibition is to introduce a limitation in international law on the military targets or objectives that may be selected by the adversaries, apart from strengthening humanitarian law with reference to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

To sum up, my delegation thinks of the future convention as being a set of rules derived from jus cogens with the purpose of prohibiting certain acts of aggression because of the specific characteristic they have of involving a risk of mass destruction. That is to say, the prohibition is confined to attacks, whatever their nature. The property we want to protect is nuclear facilities, in that they have this inherent possibility of releasing radioactivity indiscriminately. Finally, the justification for making this commitment is that it is in the interests of States to avoid unnecessary or intolerable injury from radiation to their peoples and to the environment.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

In the view of my delegation, this is the legal, political and moral framework within which the future convention should be drawn up. It is on these principles that we have prepared the convention that today we are submitting for the consideration of the distinguished delegations represented at the Conference. Working document CD/929, which we have submitted this morning, takes due account of the main elements that appear in the annex to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee submitted to the Conference last year. It also includes useful elements that were contained in the bilateral agreement signed a few months ago by India and Pakistan. Finally, it introduces new elements in an effort at conciliation and at rationalization of the rewarding debate that has been taking place for several years in this Conference. As we said at the beginning of this statement, we do not think that with this new draft we have managed to resolve all problems or dispel all doubts, nor do we think we shall have satisfied everyone, but what we want to do is to prompt thought and stimulate debate with an unorthodox, fresh and general approach based on a desire to provide for the different situations, all equally legitimate, raised by the question of attacks on nuclear facilities. At all events what we should not forget is that if we want to have an agreement that is universal in its scope and participation, then we shall have to accommodate the concerns of all, including those States that without having nuclear facilities on their territories find themselves threatened by the release of radioactivity caused by an attack on a nuclear facility in their neighbourhood. It is the wish of my delegation that document CD/929 should be submitted to Contact Group B of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, which is co-ordinated by Mr. Givers of the Netherlands, with a view to its being used as a basis for discussion and analysis. I do not think I need now explain the provisions that appear in the eight articles of the draft convention. My delegation considers it preferable to go into that matter in more detail at an appropriate time in the Ad Hoc Committee. Meanwhile we are at the disposal of other distinguished delegations that are interested in holding consultations with a view to arriving at a more generally acceptable text.

I should now like to make one or two comments on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. My first words of course are to Ambassador Morel, to congratulate him, and also the Chairmen of the five working groups, for the dedication and brilliance with which they are conducting their work. Bent as we all are on concluding the negotiations as soon as possible, in accordance with the spirit of the Paris Conference, my delegation cannot but salute the great effort that is being made by the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its responsibilities in this field. As you know the negotiations taking place in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to arriving at the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons are unique in post-war multilateral negotiations, and that is worth remembering. In the first place, we are faced with negotiations that have no deadline; that is to say, we attend them and take part in them without any time-limit, remaining exposed to changes in the international environment, and hence liable to go over the same ground year after year. If we had a deadline for completing our work, or at least a particular year accepted by everyone, then our work might take on a different pace and a different look. The lack of such a date might make an unkind observer think the conclusion of the convention could be put off ad infinitum.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Another factor that makes these negotiations unique is that so far the mandate still does not explicitly refer to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Obviously, this is in everybody's mind, but when it is a matter of establishing the relationship of the future convention with the Geneva Protocol of 1925, a divergence appears. Obviously, nobody is thinking of a total prohibition, but of a limited prohibition of use, whether it is first, second or whatever use. But the fact is that this is still not clear.

Another factor has to do with the proliferation of provisions and texts, all of them related to the future convention, which would also make it unique, because it would be necessary to agree not only on the basic provisions but also on all the regulations and subsidiary aspects connected with the application of the various articles of the convention. We are therefore faced with a situation in which we have to concern ourselves with both legislating and regulating, sometimes finding that the regulatory aspect prevails over the legislative. The interrelationship that in the end exists between them, their value from the legal point of view and the differences that could arise as a result of different régimes in domestic law do not allow us to rule out the possibility of new and unwelcome complications in the future.

Related to this last factor is the question of the "rolling text" - a good term coined some time ago - which has made it possible to maintain continuity over the past few years. Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether we should keep that term. Perhaps the time has come to give a new name to the text coming out of the Ad Hoc Committee, because it could happen that continuity comes to mean continuing for continuing's sake, which is not at all the same thing. We could think of a preliminary draft convention for next year, and that would appear to be the most logical thing if we wish to be consistent with the Final Declaration of Paris.

Finally, another factor that makes these negotiations special is the method of work. At first sight, it would appear logical to try to make specific progress in all areas related to the future convention, and yet when the pace and progress of the work is not smooth and even in all areas, that is to say, when there are ups and downs, we do not see why we cannot choose to defer until a later stage those subsidiary questions that need to mature further so that we can concentrate our attention and efforts on the major subjects that are interdependent and indispensable, in order to give the convention its final form. A popular saying is "Jack of all trades, master of none", and it might be advisable not to disregard that advice, incidentally making it easier for everyone to get a grasp of all the really substantive issues that will shape the future convention. I think it is very good to redouble on efforts and hold all kinds of meetings, but only in the knowledge that we are not going to disappoint expectations and that we are going to have a final text of the convention within our reach.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

(The President)

The Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As usual, the timetable is indicative and can be changed, if the need arises. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt the informal paper.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today. I shall now proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 11 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.516
11 July 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 11 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

GE.89-61982/0765B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 516th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I learnt with deep regret the news of the passing away last week of His Excellency Janos Kadar, former Prime Minister of Hungary, who for a long time exerted considerable political influence in his own country and had a significant role in the development of European co-operation. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish to extend our condolences to the Hungarian delegation and request it to transmit our expressions of sympathy to its Government and to the family of the late leader.

I should like to extend a warm welcome in the Conference to His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, who will be our first speaker today. In so doing, I should like to stress the important contribution that Finland, a non-member, has been making to the work of this Conference on a number of agenda items. I am sure that all members will follow his statement with particular interest.

The Conference begins today its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Sweden. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Finland, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): Mr. President, first of all I would wish to express my great appreciation for the fact that I have the possibility of addressing the CD under your chairmanship.

I shall devote my statement today to the issue of chemical weapons, although Finland attaches great importance to all items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. A complete ban on chemical weapons has clearly become one of the foremost priorities of international disarmament efforts. It is an issue of today, not of any undefined later day in the future. The negotiations for a comprehensive chemical weapons convention within the Conference on Disarmament are where our efforts should be concentrated. The global approach is the only one that can have durable results. At the same time Finland is ready to participate in complementary international efforts as long as they truly uphold the main objective and do not lead to any diversions from it. It was in this spirit that we participated in the Paris Conference last January. It is in this spirit that we support the United Nations Secretary-General's role in investigating reports of possible use of chemical weapons and the work of the qualified experts' group in developing this procedure. It will be in this spirit that we shall go to Canberra next September.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

In Paris last January the world community, practically in its entirety, condemned once again these sinister weapons of mass destruction, and gave strengthened impetus to the on-going negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. The Paris Conference called for the redoubling of efforts in these negotiations; and redoubled they were. The Conference also called for all States to make their contribution to these negotiations. As a result new countries joined the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as observers. Despite these positive developments one can sense widespread disappointment after the spring session of the CD as to the concrete results achieved in the aftermath of the Paris Conference. We acknowledge the fact that an effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention is both technically and politically complex and no quick breakthroughs are to be expected. During the spring session several issues which had not been discussed for some years were taken up again. This was helpful as a reminder of the wide scope of issues that still have to be addressed. Lengthy discussions were dedicated to other issues, which, although relevant to the final outcome, could now be left aside for the time being in order to have more time for tackling the major problems.

We share the concern of several other delegations that the impetus created by the Paris Conference will wither away in the absence of meaningful concrete results on the major questions. We strongly feel that the time has come for shifting the main emphasis in the negotiations to the politically problematic aspects. This would also help the technical experts to correctly focus their work on the real needs of the convention. Otherwise the technical discussions will become a never-ending story of new gaps and new theoretical possibilities to be covered. The basic information available to the negotiators is already sufficient for this shift to take place.

I will now turn to some of the issues at hand in the negotiations which we consider to be of major significance.

First, there is the issue of existing stocks of chemical weapons and their destruction. It is of cardinal importance for the credibility of the convention that all existing stocks be declared from the very beginning and that their destruction be promptly initiated. The order of destruction needs to foreclose any possibilities for proliferation of chemical weapons once the convention enters into force. It goes without saying that the verification measures covering this issue have to be the strictest possible under the convention. We have welcomed the information the two major possessors of chemical weapons have provided about their destruction programmes already under way. As was pointed out during the spring session the safe destruction of the existing stocks is both technically difficult and costly. We hope that the technology that has been developed for this purpose by the Soviet Union and the United States could be made available in due course to any interested country. This would ensure that all existing stocks were disposed of safely within the lime-limits set in the Convention.

Secondly, effective verification that no new chemical weapons will be produced once the convention enters into force is of essential importance. Unlike the arrangements for the destruction of the existing stocks, these

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

measures have no fixed time-limit. When approaching this issue one has to keep constantly in mind the purpose of the convention, which sets the limits to the verification measures. The main task is to verify non-production of chemical weapons. We have not undertaken to monitor the whole production of all the chemical industries of the world. Not even the production of dangerous or lethal chemicals as such. We are interested in the weaponizable chemicals, in weaponizable quantities, and, in making sure that they are not being used to produce weapons. Beyond that, the verification of non-production of minor quantities in a cost-effective way will become increasingly difficult. The best we can strive for is to create a régime that can be used to clear any doubts of non-compliance. If possible, that should be done even before such doubts become serious. In practical terms that would mean a régime that allows selective intrusiveness, includes a factor of surprise, and uses technically and scientifically sound methods. We are convinced that all the main elements required are already in existence. The technical methods have been developed to the extent that non-production of the named chemicals can be verified. The further tuning of these methods now depends on clear definitions of all parts of the régime.

The concept of mandatory short-notice on-site inspections and the details of that part of the verification régime should be taken up as a matter of priority during this summer session. The challenge inspections and the different proposals concerning ad hoc procedures should be moulded into a consistent régime which allows for a flexible application of measures to the variety of situations that may arise. Without going into the details of such a régime we feel that the inspections should always be conducted by the Technical Secretariat. There should also be a possibility for the Technical Secretariat to initiate the process. The most important feature, however, is that the inspections falling under this category should constitute a normal procedure under the convention. Their role should be regarded as preventive and not as offensive or as a last resort. Care should also be taken to create reasonable safeguards against abuse of the régime. The inspection activities should not decrease the confidence of the country being inspected or its industry in regard to the overall usefulness of the convention.

The third part is the relationship between the chemical weapons convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In our opinion the convention will have to supersede the provisions of the Protocol, including the reservations made to it. The convention bans chemical weapons from the day it comes into force. The destruction period of 10 years is there to create a realistic timespan to get rid of the existing stocks safely. When the use of chemical weapons is prohibited by the convention there can be no excuses for circumventing that obligation. The maintenance in force of the reservations to the Geneva Protocol would maintain the option of the second use of chemical weapons. This would clearly undermine the convention.

Fourth comes the right of every nation to strive for the normal and legitimate development of its own industrial base including the chemical industries. The convention cannot compel the Governments of the States parties on behalf of the individual enterprises to transfer technology when it

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

is against the interests and will of the owners of that technology. However, nothing in the convention should prevent the transfer of technology for permitted purposes. Under the convention the verification régime is for the purpose of ultimately verifying that the technologies and chemicals are not used illegitimately.

We clearly understand that the inclusion of this kind of a provision in the convention is important to the nations whose chemical industry is in the early stages of development. As a confidence-builder it is comparable to the value some other countries, including my own, attach to the verification provisions. The export controls that many countries are preparing or already imposing on relevant chemicals and technologies should be regarded as necessary provisional measures. In the absence of a global ban the spread of chemical weapons and the widening availability of long-range delivery systems for them is everyone's concern. The spectre of long-range chemical warfare should not be allowed to go free. After the chemical weapons convention has come into force the importance of these controls will diminish. Their application to trade between the States parties could then be relaxed.

Universal adherence to the Convention is of utmost importance for it to be effective. The legitimate concerns and interests of all nations should be given equal attention during the negotiations. This can be done in two parallel ways without hampering the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament as the negotiating body. First, all countries willing to make an active contribution should be encouraged to do so. The observer countries here in the CD should make full use of this opportunity to put forward their views and have them duly reflected in the process. The number of observers has grown considerably since earlier years, and we hope that this trend will continue. Secondly, efforts should be made to inform those countries which, for different reasons, cannot participate in the negotiations even as observers. In this field we acknowledge the valuable work done by Australia in promoting regional awareness about chemical weapons issues.

I would like to turn now to some more detailed and technical aspects of the convention. Earlier I touched upon some general aspects of the verification of compliance with the convention. However, verification does not only involve working out the necessary procedures in the convention itself. The development of reliable technical methods and instruments to carry out the specific verification tasks that those procedures entail is equally important. Moreover, this work is continuous and requires constant attention, testing, research and improvement in all the fields connected with the inspection activities.

It is precisely these aspects of CW verification to which Finland has devoted considerable efforts and resources since 1973. Our research project is conducted by a team of scientists and financed by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Project develops instrumental methods for detection, identification and analysis of chemical warfare agents. The results of this work, as we know, have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament in the form of handbook-type annual reports, the Finnish Blue Books. The latest

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

report, the fourteenth of the series, will be introduced here in the very near future. The new Blue Book is a revised version of Report D.1, "Standard Operating Procedures for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament" which was presented to the CD last summer. Revisions have been made on the basis of experience gained in applying our procedures to 40 chemicals. A chapter on liquid chromatography has been added, and all experimental data have been presented in the Appendix.

During the last years the Finnish Project has devoted considerable efforts to some of the basic elements of the inspection activities directly connected with the verification régime of the Convention. These are: instrumentation, standard operating procedures and computerized data base for the identification of the scheduled chemicals.

The instrumentation of the verification laboratories has been described in the recent working paper submitted by Finland (CD/CW/WP.253) which was introduced in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during the meeting with the representatives of chemical industries two weeks ago.

So far there is no generally accepted method for CW verification analyses. The standard operating procedures designed by our Project try to fill that gap. The need for generally accepted procedures is evident. All the analyses of the samples taken by the inspection teams should be carefully handled by identical procedures and analysed by exactly the same methods. Only then can the results become comparable. Only, then can they be universally relied upon, and leave no doubts about the scientific value of the findings. The importance of this cannot be over-estimated, as any violation will immediately become a political issue of large international dimensions. There must be no uncertainty about the soundness of the results.

Moreover, such precision combined with total impartiality can only be guaranteed if there is a network of qualified laboratories especially accredited to conduct the analyses. On one hand, the scientific and operational quality of these laboratories would have to be constantly tested and verified. On the other hand, the origin and nature of the real samples would have to be concealed from the laboratories. This would guarantee the impartiality of the analyses and minimize the risk of the disclosure of confidential information.

In order to guarantee world-wide distribution of the accredited laboratories, training in the analytical methods and in the use of the instruments is crucial. Also the inspectors of the International Inspectorate will have to be trained in these skills. Finland announced at the Paris Conference last January that it would be willing to provide this type of training for chemists from developing countries. I am now in a position to give more details of this training programme. It will be made available at this first stage to the interested member States of the Conference on Disarmament belonging to the Group of 21. The training course will have a duration of four months, and three analytical chemists can be trained at each course. We envisage organizing two courses a year, and thus six qualified

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

chemists can be trained annually. Originally we had hoped to be able to offer training for a larger number of chemists at a time. However, doing that would necessarily have meant a considerable loss of quality in the instruction. The real instructor/trainee ratio of our programme of about one to one during the entire four-month period also reveals the dimensions of the training efforts that are required internationally well before the entry into force of the CW Convention. During our course the participants will be trained in sample collection, preparation of the samples, chromatographic methods, laboratory automation and the use of the computerized data base. Also, the basics of mass spectrometry and its use as the detector of a chromatograph will be taught. All the instruction is designed especially for the purposes of the CW verification. The cost of the training, travel from home country and back, accommodation as well as a daily allowance will be provided by Finland. The only financial implication for the sending Government would thus be the basic salary during the time of the course. We hope that this offer will meet the interests of several of the members of the Group of 21.

The computerized data base was first introduced to the CD a year ago, during the summer session of 1988. It will enable any analyst anywhere in the world to compare the results of his analysis with the characteristics of the scheduled chemicals stored in the data base. In an instant he will be able to tell for sure whether the compound he has been analysing is one of the scheduled compounds or not. This is an indispensable tool for the inspectors. To achieve the desired result, only one condition has to be met: the sampling, the handling of the samples, their analysis, and the instrumentation should follow the same detailed procedures that were followed when the data base was prepared. Again the need for the standard operating procedures is evident. Another prerequisite for the functioning of the data base is that the chemicals that are to be monitored must be individually defined. Broader definitions like families of compounds will not suffice. Furthermore, every one of these compounds must be synthesized and analysed for data storage. As of today the data base of the Finnish project includes 40 compounds. Here we should like to thank both the United Kingdom and Switzerland for having supplied us with the necessary material to get us where we are now in this work. In order to make it easier for everybody to visualize the functioning of the data base, a live demonstration of it will be arranged here in Geneva during the second week of August, to which all the members and observers of the CD will be invited.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to the presidency. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STÜLPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on your assumption of your important office.

My statement today relates to item 5 of our agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". It will be very brief. Its main purpose is to comment on the expert contribution which will be provided at this afternoon's

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

meeting of the Ad hoc Committee. As already announced in my plenary statement on our basic views on the matter on 11 April this year, we had asked an independent research institute in the Federal Republic of Germany to examine our positions and proposals introduced so far and to come up with a comprehensive view on the question of space-related confidence-building measures. Today Dr. Hubert Feigl from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik will share his findings with the members of the Committee. He will - in particular - deal with "objectives, realizable possibilities and problems of a multilateral protection régime for outer space" and related questions. Dr. Feigl will provide us with the independent view of a scientist. His arguments will speak for themselves. His paper is based on non-classified sources and its contents are subejct to verification. In the belief that more profound discussion will bring more progress my delegation would like to stimulate debate in the Ad hoc Committee on the basis of a well founded set of interrelated expert views.

Dr. Feigl's contribution will draw a kind of road map in this regard, pointing out which roads from his point of view are impossible or almost impossible and possible as far as a weapons-related ASAT ban is concerned and the implications this has for the objective of an ASAT ban itself. He will also be pointing out the roads which may more easily lead to the intended improvement of the protection of space in general and the protection of stability-related satellites in particular.

When, in 1986, my delegation introduced the subject of space-related confidence-building measures, including a "code of conduct" and "rules of the road", as an idea which could substantially contribute to attenuating the effects of unintended escalation and to limiting the risks arising from misunderstandings in crisis situations, the corresponding proposals seemed to be too technical and too complicated to be dealt with in the Ad hoc Committee at that juncture. In the meantime the Committee has gained experience and achieved a much better understanding of the many questions involved. My delegation feels encouraged to reiterate its former proposals as contained in PV.345 of 6 March 1986 and developed further in my plenary statement of 11 April this year and the corresponding contributions to the work of the Ad hoc Committee. We know that we shall have to convince the Conference of the usefulness and adequacy of these proposals. The presence of an independent expert is a welcome opportunity to re-examine them in a critical common effort.

It may be useful and necessary to briefly describe the background against which this effort should be seen. There is no doubt that certain space objects - such as satellites with verification, observation, communication and command functions - are vital components of strategic stability. Accordingly, it would be counterproductive to prohibit, per se, all military activities in outer space. Multilateral arms control and disarmament matters in the outer space area cannot be considered independently of basic developments at the bilateral level. Many of the space-related problems will - by their nature - remain the domain of the two main space Powers. The prevention of an arms race in outer space by adequate and appropriate arms control measures touches

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

upon basic questions of strategic stability between these Powers. The related questions have still to be solved in the bilateral talks. We believe that nothing should be done that would hinder the success of these negotiations.

On the other hand, it is widely agreed that in view of dynamic technological developments, many aspects of a future outer space order inevitably necessitate comprehensive regulation by the international community as such. It is rightly recognized, too, that more and more States are becoming space Powers or participating in important programmes for the exploration and utilization of outer space. Furthermore, all States could be threatened by a possible misuse of that environment. Thus there are good reasons for an approach requiring greater participation by the international community. The creation of a robust, stable future space order is a task ahead. My delegation will continue to actively contribute to preparing the ground for its realization.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Let me first of all congratulate you, as representative of a friendly nation, Mongolia, on your assumption of the responsible post of Chairman of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. Your great diplomatic experience, including our experience of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, gives us every a surance that your efforts to organize the Conference's work during this important period of its summer session will be attended by success. At the same time we wish you every success in performing your duties as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, a position you are now occupying for the second time. Since today, 11 July, is the national holiday of the Mongolian People's Republic - People's Revolution Day - I should like to take this opportunity to extend our sincere congratulations to Ambassador Bayart and the whole Mongolian delegation.

I should also like to thank our doyen, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, for presiding over the work of the Conference in June with his customary wisdom.

We welcome among us today Mr. Karhilo, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, whose important statement we listened to with great interest. Mr. Karhilo's presence here and his statement confirm once again the active position taken in disarmament matters by Finland, with which my country has traditionally maintained close goodneighbourly relations.

We should like to convey our deep sympathy to the Hungarian delegation on the death of Comrade J. Kadar, who was leader of his country for many years. We would ask the delegation to pass on our heartfelt condolences to the Government of Hungary and to the deceased's family and friends.

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The Soviet delegation in its previous statement of 22 June expounded the basic approach of the Soviet Union to a broad range of disarmament issues in a wider context of creating a secure democratic world. Today I would like to elaborate in more detail on the problem which is in our view central to the work of the Conference, that is, the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It would hardly be an overstatement to say that we are living through a critical turning point in the negotiations, with all the controversies that are to be expected at such times.

To speak of the positive aspects, there is in particular the fact that the draft convention is in an advanced state of preparation. At the Conference held in Paris earlier this year, virtually all States assumed, at a high level, moral and political commitments in relation to the earliest conclusion of the convention. Many countries and groups of countries have recently stated, individually or jointly, their support for the cause of banning chemical weapons. The relevant provisions of the comprehensive arms control and disarmament concept adopted at the NATO summit in Brussels are very much welcome in this connection, and particularly the intention expressed in it by the NATO leaders of concluding at an early date a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable treaty banning any chemical weapon, its development, production, storage or transfer. We also notice that the most recently published NATO documents seem to suggest that chemical weapons are not regarded as an integral element of deterrence, which in view of NATO's general philosophy of arms limitation raises hopes of a truly complete renunciation by all its members of this gruesome means of extermination. As for the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the leaders of the allied countries at their summit meeting held literally a few days ago in Bucharest called for efforts to speed up the preparation of an international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stocks.

Finally, among the positive elements we have are the restructuring of the negotiating process carried out under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Morel, the presence of a significantly greater number of observers at the negotiations, and the fact that progress towards a convention has gone beyond the limits of pure negotiations and reached a stage when a whole number of countries have started practical preparations for their participation in the future agreement.

On the other hand, during the spring session of 1989 and in the early days of the summer session, the multilateral negotiations failed to reach the desired tempo. We get the impression that external political stimulus is taking too long to be transformed into progress in negotiations which necessarily requires the readiness of every participant to take resolute steps and make bold compromises. A considerable portion of time this year was consumed by the discussion of technical details. In itself, this might be no bad thing, but even then we were often going round in circles. The devil is in the details, they say, and exorcizing him from wherever he might be always requires an extreme effort of will, which in our case, naturally, means political will. It is also needed to resolve some of the still outstanding

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basic issues. The foregoing does not necessarily imply that nothing has been achieved recently. One positive example in the area of technical details is the adjustment of the schedules of chemicals covered by the convention on the basis of limiting the radicals of alkyl and o-alkyl fragments in the respective chemicals, undertaken by the Chairman of Group 4. In the realm of political problems the efforts undertaken by Ambassador Morel on the composition of the Executive Council and challenge inspections (article IX) are highly commendable.

However, we can and must move ahead faster than we are now doing. Many representatives, in giving their analysis of the state of negotiations, stressed that any loss of time or momentum now is extremely dangerous and that the impetus generated in Paris would fail to be a long-term factor if not supported in Geneva. The Soviet delegation fully shares this opinion. Delay in the negotiations is all the more unacceptable in that it takes place against a background of dangerous trends in chemical weapons proliferation. Being decidedly opposed to the spread of chemical weapons, we lend our support to international efforts to counteract this threat and we are improving our national measures in this field. In doing so, we are fully aware that the only thoroughly effective solution to this problem is a comprehensive convention concluded at the earliest date and without any linkage to other disarmament measures.

Negotiations are not the only way we use to pursue this goal. In the USSR the appropriate agencies are preparing recommendations on the order and time of construction of chemical weapons destruction facilities, including their location. Their capacity will ensure the destruction of our entire CW stock in the Soviet Union in the time period set by the draft convention. This will demand the solution of a whole set of problems related to the transport of the weapons, their disassembly and destruction. Priority attention is given here to environmental protection.

We are also engaged in active bilateral discussions with a whole range of countries on the problem of a chemical weapons ban. In particular, during the recent visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Bonn, a statement on a chemical weapons ban was adopted at the level of the ministers for foreign affairs. At the request of the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR, this statement, together with the joint statement of the leaders of the two countries on the results of the visit, are being distributed as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/930 and CD/931).

In June, beginning right on the very first day of this summer session, the eleventh round of Soviet-United States discussions on a chemical weapons ban took place here in Geneva. This has been one of the most productive rounds since we began meeting with the United States delegation in pursuance of the agreement reached in Geneva in November 1985 by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. Substantial progress was made as a result of intensive work at the plenaries, restricted meetings between the heads of delegations, and meetings of experts. This relates in the first instance to the draft paper on procedures for challenge inspections, which we believe might soon be submitted

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for examination to Working Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Considerable progress was also made in preparing proposals on the order of destruction of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities, though some questions relating to certain numerical parameters and terminology still need to be resolved. A useful discussion was held on permitted production and synthesis o Schedule I chemicals as well as on toxins. Finally, although no complete agreement has been reached as yet, we have made progress on a whole range of bilateral measures of confidence-building, openness and mutual inspection. These measures are to be implemented even before the future convention is signed. All in all, we are encouraged with the results of the round and hope that after some time they will have a favourable influence on the multilateral negotiations as well - the subject which I would now like to turn to.

We believe that by now the conditions are ripe for us to finish putting together the essential verification system. The basis for such a system is there - it is the combination of systematic and challenge inspections. Yet unresolved issues still remain in every area. We are convinced that challenge inspections without exemptions or the right of refusal, extending equally to any site or facility, be it military or civil, State-owned or private, are an essential element of the future verification system. We urge all those who have not yet done so to make an unequivocal statement that they accept the principle of such inspections. Should any members have specific difficulties, let them openly state where such difficulties lie.

We do not share the opinion which has sometimes been voiced here that challenge inspections are excessively confrontational. (By the way, I should like to ask whether it might not be as well for us to stop using the word "challenge" and say "request" instead.) At the same time we would be prepared to give an attentive look at the arguments of those delegations which believe they would be more comfortable if alongside the mechanism of challenge inspections the convention contained procedures which did not involve expressing suspicions about any State.

The proposal of the United Kingdom on ad hoc inspections which could, as we understand it, be carried out at any site or facility could form a good basis for such an additional verification sub-system. True, we would prefer that quota limitations should only apply to the number of inspections which a State would be obliged to receive on its territory within a given period of time. The so-called active quota would not then be introduced. Otherwise, States would always have to be afraid of exhausting their quotas too quickly, and this in its turn could limit their real possibility of exercising the right of request. As for the passive quota, we believe it could amount to about five inspections per year. Provisions should also be worked out containing specific requirements for requests to make ad hoc inspections, namely, an indication of the location and the specific type of activity to be verified. This is necessary if such inspections are to be effective.

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The issues of what should be the starting point for challenge inspections and what their scope should be are of fundamental importance. Of equal importance is what the end result of these inspections should be. In our opinion, for the sake of having an effectively functioning convention mechanism there is everything to be said for taking no decisions as to compliance by a State with the convention when reports on challenge inspection results are discussed in the bodies of an international organization established under the convention. Instead, where necessary, recommendations would be adopted on measures to ensure compliance with the convention. Among such measures certain sanctions could also be considered. We believe that a similar procedure could also be applied to the consideration of reports on routine inspection results.

Recently, there have also been signs of progress in working out a régime of systematic verification, in particular within the framework of article VI of the draft convention. In this context we take note with satisfaction of the support given by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf to the idea of including Schedule 2B in the convention.

We also support the idea that in addition to the so-called "régime" schedules of chemicals, on the basis of which certain measures of limitation or verification would be taken, a "marker" list - or as it is called - a "waiting and warning" list should be envisaged for substances capable of posing a risk for the purposes of the convention. The scientific and consultative council which would be established within the framework of an international organization unde the future convention and which would perform the function of keeping track c innovations in chemistry would also participate in drawing up the list. A part of the council's membership could be elected from candidates proposed by international scientific organizations.

Taking into account the view of a number of States that laboratory synthesis of Schedule I chemicals should be permitted not only for medical and research purposes, but also for the purposes of protection, we would be prepared to agree to such synthesis being carried out at a State's discretion either at a small-scale facility or at one laboratory synthesizing not more than 100 g of Schedule I chemicals, with its location and the names of the chemicals synthesized being declared. We do not propose that either this laboratory or any other laboratory synthesizing Schedule I chemicals should be subject to systematic international verification. At the same time we believe it is important to envisage approval and declaration by States parties of all laboratories synthesizing Schedule I chemicals for permitted purposes. A positive solution to this problem would considerably facilitate agreement on this section of the convention in general. As for production of Schedule I chemicals for pharmaceutical purposes outside a small-scale facility, we would be prepared to agree to the proposal that their annual quantity should not exceed 10 kg for each facility in question.

A number of delegations have recently expressed concern that with the verification systems under article VI as they now stand, multi-purpose facilities, as well as facilities which are not producing chemicals posing a

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risk for the purposes of the convention but whose characteristics would make it quite possible to organize such production, would not be covered. To a certain extent the solution to this problem would be facilitated if thresholds for declaration and verification were determined on the basis of the design capacity of facilities, rather than their production levels. It would also be useful for the Technical Secretariat to be entitled to submit independently a request for inspection if in the exercise of systematic verification activities by the Technical Secretariat a need arises to clarify certain obligations. We are also ready to consider constructively other proposals aimed at increasing the effectiveness of vertification of non-production of chemical weapons in industry and will support any verification measure leading to greater security. The solution of the problem of non-production of chemical weapons in industry is possible on the basis of a balance between the need to have the most stringent verification and the legitimate industrial and commercial interests of States parties to the convention.

Finalization of work on the system of verification would be much facilitated by the early introduction of international trial inspections under the experiment launched last year to test procedures for the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in industry. As far as we see, some delegations have certain apprehensions over the idea of international trial inspections. I believe these apprehensions are somewhat exaggerated. The Soviet Union would be prepared to hold such an experiment at a facility in Dzerzhinsk as soon as the procedures for it are arranged and agreement reached on starting such inspections in other countries. The Soviet delegation believes that it would be appropriate to agree on the most important problems to be studied in the experiment. We propose that this work should be begun as soon as possible. In our view, the membership of the international group of inspectors and observers for visits to facilities should be limited and should not exceed 10-20 persons.

The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of having a truly global convention. The ultimate goal should be universal participation of States in the convention. Naturally, it is for each State to decide, by weighing all the pros and cons, whether participation in the convention would or would not be in its national interest. Hence the conclusion that for the widest possible participation of States in the convention, it should provide certain benefits in terms of protection against chemical weapons for its participants who have renounced chemical weapons, as compared with other countries. In this context we attach great significance, in particular, to article X of the convention, dealing with assistance and protection against chemical weapons. The Soviet delegation would be prepared to support the idea of establishing a voluntary fund to render assistance to any State party against which chemical weapons were used. The fund would be an integral part of a mutual assistance mechanism within the international organization set up under the convention. We believe that financial resources and appropriate material facilities, including means of chemical protection, could be contributed to that fund.

In conclusion, a few words on the topic which has been repeatedly discussed both inside and outside the conference room - the forthcoming conference on chemical weapons to be attended by representatives of

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Governments and industry at Canberra in September. The Soviet Union has decided to particpate in this Conference. We are particularly satisfied with the fact that it will focus on joint action by Governments and industry aimed at the early conclusion and implementation of the convention banning chemical weapons. We believe, as I have already said, that taking into account legitimate interests of industry is essential for the success of the Geneva negotiations. From this standpoint the significance of the Canberra Conference is very great. The Soviet delegation at that conference will be prepared to make a constructive contribution to the discussions on the agenda items and to help it arrive at positive results.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I thank him also for the warm congratulations to my delegation on the occasion of our national day and the very kind words addressed to my country and to me personally. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): Let me first of all warmly congratulate you not only on the occasion of your national day but also on your assumption of the presidency during the month of July. I am confident that our work will greatly benefit from your diplomatic skill. That skill has been shown, inter alia, in your chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It is therefore particularly appropriate to devote a plenary statement to this question under your presidency. I also take this opportunity to express the gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador García Robles of Mexico for his experienced guidance of the Conference during the past month. I have listened with great interest to the statement by His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State of Finland and to the other distinguished speakers before me.

In my statement today I will exclusively address the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Useful work has been carried out in the Conference on Disarmament, and in particular in its Ad Hoc Committee, in existence since 1985. The time should now be ripe to take stock of the extensive discussions and the many proposals which have been made. Our continued deliberations should be structured with a view to defining measures on how to prevent an arms race in outer space. An extension of the arms race into outer space could have profoundly destabilizing consequences. Deeply conscious of these risks, an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations have in recent years urged the Conference on Disarmament to take resolute measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

Although the civilian exploitation of outer space is increasing, the vast majority of satellites perform military functions. There is a great variety in their missions. Some of them play, or have a potential to play, a vital role in verifying compliance with arms limitation or disarmament agreements, or carry out crucial early-warning and communication tasks. These satellites thus have stabilizing functions. Some are in geosynchronous orbit, or in eccentric earth orbit, and others are in lower earth orbit. Mention could be made of reconnaissance satellites with photographic, electronic or

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ocean-surveillance tasks. In principle, all these satellites can have important functions in connection with weapons systems on earth. Their military role, however, is of a passive nature. Military support satellites may, nevertheless, be given more active assignments, for instance regarding target acquisition and identification, or other active support functions for military operations. The various types of satellites are becoming increasingly sophisticated and manoeuvrable.

In time of war, satellites could thus be important military targets. Consequently, there has long been a military interest in developing means for anti-satellite warfare. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have tested dedicated ASAT systems. Their actual deployment is, however, limited. One of the concepts comprised an interceptor launched into the same orbital plane as the target. The other system was an air-launched miniature vehicle with a terminal homing warhead. Both systems were reportedly capable of reaching targets in low earth orbit only.

There may be reason to recall the diversity of means of carrying out ASAT warfare A satellite can be disrupted, either by being physically destroyed or through interference with some of its vital functions. A satellite could for instance be destroyed by impact with space debris. Ballistic missiles could be modified for ASAT purposes. ABM-interceptors could have an inherent ASAT capability. To be effective, however, these weapons would have to be tested in an ASAT mode. Some potential ASAT weapons could in addition perform anti-ballistic-missile defence tasks. They could thus lend themselves to a circumvention of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, the functions of a satellite could also be impaired by jamming or spoofing operations. Command and control communications could be interfered with in a similar fashion and the satellite's sensors incapacitated by laser radiation. Electronic warfare or high-power microwaves could also be used for such functions.

A whole literature has developed regarding technological research on potential earth-based or space-based weapon devices, related to kinetic energy or directed energy principles. One example is clusters of homing vehicles equipped with infra-red guidance. As to directed energy weapons, various lasers under consideration are the chemical laser, the free electron laser, the excimer laser, and the X-ray laser. The last is for obvious reasons the most controversial concept, since such a laser would have to be "pumped" by a nuclear explosion. Whereas some of the concepts referred to may carry a flavour of science finction, others could have a more realistic potential for ASAT tasks, although the context in which they are being considered apparently concerns ballistic missile defences. Satellites could be considerably easier to attack than missiles, because of their overall features as well as of their static orbit positions.

It may sometimes be difficult to make a clear distinction between dedicated ASAT weapons and non-dedicated capabilities to interfere with the normal functioning of a spacecraft. Any spacecraft capable of manoeuvring in orbit could be programmed to interfere with another space object. Even if a

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satellite can by itself function as an interceptor, to be considered as a dedicated ASAT weapon it should inter alia be equipped with interceptors aimed at destroying other satellites.

It goes without saying that many counter-measures could be conceived of against various contemplated or existing means of interfering with satellites. A satellite could, for example, be hardened against directed-energy weapons, if such devices were to be developed for ASAT purposes, infra-red sensors could be blinded by lasers, a satellite could be shut off, and satellites could be deployed in large numbers, etc.

Questions pertaining to the strategic balance are subject to bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers. However, the issue of ballistic missile defences is, along with the ASAT question, of relevance also to the Conference on Disarmament. All nations would be affected by a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, as well as by other possible destabilizing developments that are implied.

One contemplated BMD system would contain both space-based and so-called "pop-up" systems, based on the new "exotic" technologies I have referred to. Several counter-measures could be expected against such systems. Thus, to mention just one example, a warhead decoy could by simulation be made to respond like a re-entry vehicle and, conversely, a re-entry vehicle to respond like a decoy, etc. In accordance with a familiar pattern, counter-measures could indeed proliferate. At the same time, the decision-making process to a large extent will have to be assigned to supercomputers, etc. By such a development the survival of mankind would increasingly be getting into the grip of machines.

The many critics of ballistic missile defences have underlined the destabilizing implications. There is a great risk that an adversary with less efficient ballistic missile defences would be tempted to resort to a pre-emptive strike. Furthermore, if the two major nuclear and space Powers were really capable of developing ballistic missile defences, other nuclear-weapon States might feel incited to live up to their doctrine of effective deterrence by significantly increasing their nuclear weapons potential.

Both the leading nuclear and space Powers continue to devote considerable resources to research on ballistic missile defences, which may have adverse implications for the ABM Treaty, and probably also for the ongoing nuclear and space talks. However, a shift in emphasis seems to be under way in favour of ASAT programmes. One reason for such a development may be attributed to the fact that, as pointed out by SIPRI in its 1989 Yearbook, a major increase has taken place in the number and capabilities of operational military satellites in several categories. This expansion also involves an increased integration of various space-based systems with land, sea and air forces, thereby enhancing their capabilities in several respects.

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Given the fact that it may be relatively easy to develop various types of ASAT weapons, other States, too, may consider strengthening their military capacities by acquiring such weapons. Already the spread of advanced missile technology could promote such a development. Increased dedicated or non-dedicated ASAT capabilities represent new risks already of accidental interference with satellites, which could have serious implications for international security.

The risk of an arms race in outer space has been partly attributed to the fact that the existing body of international law is not sufficient to effectively prevent such a development. The relevant provisions are both of a general and a specific nature. I do not intend to go over existing agreements pertaining to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, since this has been done by my delegation on previous occasions, as well as by several other delegations. It may be sufficient to touch upon a few examples.

Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations outlaws the use of force and the threat of use of force. In certain cases some might argue that an attack on a space object would be a measure of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. It is, however, inconceivable that this Article could be interpreted as permitting attacks on non-military space objects. The Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbits and on celestial bodies, but no other weapons systems. The Moon Treaty, which aims at entirely demilitarizing outer space, with the exception of the proximity of the Earth, has been signed by very few States indeed and has not yet entered into force. The Registration Convention may have some confidence-building functions, but, as pointed out by many delegations, would need to be more effectively complied with. It would also have to be strengthened by additional provisions.

As to various pertinent bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, emphasis should be given to the significant stabilizing role of the 1972 AMB Treaty. It is conceived of as a crucial building block in the strategic relationship between the two major nuclear and space Powers. Many States have therefore repeatedly urged the two Parties to the Treaty to secure its continuation.

Other bilateral disarmament agreements, which are relevant in this context are, for example, the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War and the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which secure a protection for early warning satellites, thus indicating the vital stabilizing function attributed by the two major Powers to such satellites. There may also be reason to recall the unratified SALT II Treaty, which prohibited the testing and deployment of Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS). Relevant parts of the provisions of these Treaties can be of interest also for multilateral purposes.

My delegation has consistently been in favour of a comprehensive solution to the ASAT question. Even if a comprehensive ASAT ban may not be achievable in a short-term perspective - given the wide-ranging issues involved,

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pertaining inter alia to definitions and dual functions - it is, however, of the utmost importance that we start work on delineating measures that would at least provide for basic legal provisions with regard to ASAT systems. We should also aim at strengthening the confidence-building régime, and introduce measures aiming at the prevention of accidents with satellites. In the opinion of my delegation, the approach will have to build on a combination of confidence-building and functional measures, together with a ban on anti-satellite weapons.

As an immediate measure the Swedish delegation has proposed that the present de facto moratorium by the two major space Powers on testing of existing dedicated ASAT systems be formalized. Production as well as deployment of dedicated ASATs should be prohibited without delay, and existing ASAT systems should be dismantled. Furthermore, the testing of non-dedicated systems in an ASAT mode should be prohibited. I have previously touched upon various types of non-dedicated systems, which would have to be addressed here. This approach would thus in a functional way comprise all convertible ASATs.

Furthermore, rules aiming at diminishing the risk of accidents should be introduced. Given the relatively large number of satellites in low earth orbit, measures to prevent accidents in that area are urgently called for. But also satellites in the geostationary orbit should, obviously, be covered, since they are of crucial importance for international stability and security.

Several proposals have been made in the Conference on Disarmament concerning the question of indirect protection of satellites, including rules of the road, keep-out zones, codes of conduct, immunity for satellites, etc. These proposals should be discussed in a systematic way with a view to defining relevant measures. It will also have to be established to what extent various proposed measures should be dealt with in the Conference on Disarmament, or should be referred, for instance, to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Sweden has proposed that an expert group be established under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Such a group should discuss the feasibility of relevant measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. It should also consider verification of compliance with such measures, as well as focus on questions pertaining to the establishment of an international satellite monitoring system.

Verification could be carried out by many different methods, in particular on-site inspection, as well as satellite tracking and data collection. Inspection of a satellite from the ground could, at least in the case of low earth orbit, be performed by the help of telescopes with modern electro-optical sensors. Other means could be various radar devices. These new systems can give detailed accounts of satellites. Fly-by or co-orbiting can be used for observation. In the context of verification by means of satellites the Canadian PAXSAT concept is of great relevance. Consideration should also be given to the establishment of an international satellite

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agency, taking into account the various proposals that over the years have been made in the United Nations and in the Conference on Disarmament. Such an agency could have at its disposal a network of observation stations and make use of common data bases.

The question of how to prevent an arms race in outer space is often referred to as an unusually complex one. We should, however, not let ourselves be overwhelmed by the difficulties. As I have tried to illustrate, there are several measures that the Conference on Disarmament could usefully negotiate, namely: dedicated ASAT weapons could be comprehensively banned; an agreement could be made on banning the testing in an ASAT mode of various types of non-dedicated systems; appropriate verification régimes could be scheduled, and an international satellite monitoring system be established; confidence-building measures, including rules of the road, could be adopted.

My delegation holds that these measures should be introduced as a matter of urgency, given the risks of vertical and horizontal proliferation of dedicated and non-dedicated ASAT capabilities, as well as the dangers posed by possible non-intentional harmful interference with satellites. These measures should be subject to multilateral negotiations in the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, that is to say the Conference on Disarmament, and more precisely in its Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

My delegation is fully aware of the fact that the least common denominator in the CD has hitherto not allowed for a more measure-oriented approach. As stated at the beginning of my intervention, however, Sweden is of the view that time is now ripe for more structured work in the subsidiary body of the Conference, allowing us to more purposefully address the task before us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for his statement and for the congratulations and kind words that he addressed to the presidency.

We have reached the end of the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the distinguished representative of Hungary, Ambassador Varga.

Mr. VARGA (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation expresses its thanks to you, Mr. President, and also to the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Batsanov, and at the same time to all other delegations which have acted similarly in the course of the past few days for the sympathies and condolences addressed to the Hungarian Government and our delegation on the occasion of the passing away of Mr. Janos Kadar, a prominent politician and outstanding State figure of my country for more than 30 years. My delegation will not fail to convey the expressions of condolences to the Hungarian Government and to the family of the deceased.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement. Are there any further speakers? That seems not to be the case.

You will recall that, at its 513th plenary meeting, the Conference decided to hold an informal meeting on Tuesday, 18 July, immediately after the plenary meeting, for consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. It was understood that if the debate was not concluded at that informal meeting, another informal meeting would be held on Thursday, 20 July, also after the plenary meeting scheduled for that date. Keeping in mind those dates, non-members of the Conference parties to the Sea-bed Treaty were invited to transmit their requests for participation not later than today, 11 July, so that members might consider such requests in accordance with the rules of procedure and the secretariat might have time to process the relevant draft decisions. Accordingly, I hope that non-members Parties to the Treaty wishing to participate in the informal meeting on 18 July will communicate their requests to the secretariat not later than today at 4 p.m. For your information, the secretariat has already received eight requests, which will be circulated after 4 p.m. today in delegations' boxes for consideration by members. I shall put the relevant draft decisions before the Conference at the end of the list of speakers at the plenary meeting on Tuesday, 18 July, before we open the informal meeting devoted to the subject to be discussed. In connection with the informal meeting, I should like to inform you that immediately after we adjourn this plenary meeting, the secretariat will open a list of speakers wishing to address the informal meeting. Of course, members intending to do so may ask for the floor without putting their names on the list first, in accordance with the practice followed for informal meetings of the Conference.

There is no other business for today. I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 13 July at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.517
13 July 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 13 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 517th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will today continue its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, under rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Nigeria, Iraq and Finland. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): We have just entered into the second third of the summer part of the Conference. Four weeks still remain for effective negotiation. Time is pressing if we are to reach tangible results in the negotiations on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Together we have made a fresh start following the Paris Conference. In the Paris Declaration all States came out in favour of concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. All States advocated that the prohibition of chemical weapons should be global and comprehensive as well as effectively verifiable. All States pronounced themselves in favour of concluding the negotiations on the convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest possible date. This is from our point of view the substance of the agreements reached in Paris, and this is our view of their interrelationship - you cannot do one thing without the other.

Have not the events of the recent past visibly shown that the use of chemical weapons prohibited under the Geneva Protocol can only be precluded in future if they are completely banned with global effect at the earliest possible date? To stop the production of chemical weapons, to advance towards their destruction, to prevent their proliferation - these are, no doubt, significant moves for their comprehensive prohibition. Do not measures against the proliferation of chemical weapons however, lose something of their positive impact if they are deprived of their character as an interim measure? Is it not urgently necessary to finalize work on the verification system without allowing any further delays in the negotiations? Otherwise, we think, a situation could arise where the existence of ever more sophisticated chemical weapons in ever more hands would render effective verification of their prohibition extremely complicated or would even make it impossible.

The verification system for a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has a key role in the present negotiations. Permit me, therefore, to offer a few comments on this problem. Article VI of the draft convention together with the annexes thereto already contains a sound system of provisions for effective verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. This system is being supplemented at present in Working Group 4. The final touches are being put to the régime attached to list 1. The lists of chemicals are being amended and defined.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

As regards verification of compliance with the prohibition of chemical weapons production outside the framework set by article VI, this should, in our view, be ensured, in the first place, by means of challenge inspections. A provision to this effect, however, has not been agreed upon so far. The basic ideas set forth in the "Ekeus Paper" (document CD/881, pages 141 and 142) have not been developed further since 1987. Therefore, the next logical step would be to seek understanding in principle on challenge inspection and to include relevant provisions in article IX of the draft convention. All efforts undertaken by the Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel, to this effect deserve our unqualified support.

It is, in fact, high time in our view for delegations to disclose their positions on such questions as: the right to request an on-site inspection at any time and anywhere; the mandatory character of such an inspection without a right of refusal; the procedure to be applied in case agreement on arrangements alternative to full and comprehensive access cannot be achieved; and the procedure after submission of the inspection report. In this way, it would be possible to bridge existing differences of opinion which have surfaced on this matter and to draft a mutually agreed text of article IX, part 2.

The question whether additional verification provisions are necessary beyond the framework established by article VI and the means of challenge inspection has been discussed to date without conclusive results being attained. If the general opinion tends to deem it necessary that the verification system be supplemented, we, for our part, will join in efforts to search for a generally acceptable and effective solution. It is our understanding that such measures shall correspond to defined additional verification needs and shall require no disproportionate additional costs.

I am underlining this since we should avoid formulating additional measures in the form of a costly and detailed mechanism similar to the one applied with articles IV, V and VI. On the basis of the provisions set out in article VI, it would suffice to outline the general framework for supplementary measures. It should be incumbent upon the organs of the future organization to render the procedure most effective by making use of the experience gathered in the implementation of the Convention. Here we need to clarify which supplementary measures would be eligible, routine inspections or inspections initiated by member States. Two possible approaches have been outlined in the working paper of the Federal Republic of Germany (CD/869) and in the working paper of the United Kingdom (CD/909).

At the present stage of negotiations, we believe the discussion ought to be focused on practical problems. What we have in mind in this context is to consider the possibility of concentrating additional routine verification measures, for example, ad hoc checks, on a relatively small number of facilities which on account of their technological parameters pose a risk to the convention. In this way, the available financial resources of the future Organization could be efficiently used for particularly sensitive facilities. To select such facilities would be the task in our view of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

It would be advisable to apply an objective selection mechanism. The application of advanced methods which are common practice in the chemical industry, for example, work with computer-aided synthesis banks and screening schemes, could serve as a suitable means to identify facilities which have a significant potential to be misused for CW production. Applying such a method, it would be possible to cover an important area where violations of the convention may occur, for example, facilities for organophosphorus chemistry.

Other facilities not accessible by this approach could, however, also be misused for the production of certain chemical agents. Verification on the basis of objective selection methods would not be an appropriate means of deterrence in this respect. The question is legitimate, we think, whether it would be possible to effectively make use of challenge inspection against potential violations of the convention which might occur in such facilities. If there is, however, a need for additional verification provisions, then it could, in our opinion, only be something rather different from challenge inspection. This could be done by means of a verification procedure for which the Organization would be responsible but which would be initiated by a member State.

From all this it can be gathered that the development of the verification system will be a permanent task in the implementation process of the convention. With the present system of verification provisions, which encompasses data reporting and monitoring, routine on-site inspection and challenge inspection, a reliable basis has been created to this end. It must be expandable and flexible. The provisions on the organs of the future Organization should ensure that the viability of this system is guaranteed on an institutional basis.

Those were a few comments on our part concerning the settlement of still pending essential issues in the negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons. We have made these observations in the conviction that given the requisite will and readiness of all parties, it will indeed be possible in the remainder of the session to reach an understanding on these issues and on other essential subjects under negotiation. The committed, creative and methodical guidance of the negotiations by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Morel, and his bureau encourages us in this endeavour. If we work energetically to bridge the remaining differences in a flexible manner and display the necessary sense of determination, it will be possible that the outcome yielded so far in the negotiations will be fixed in the "rolling text" and that the summer session will produce positive results. A good many things quite certainly remain to be done in order to bring about a solution on those issues where there is a possibility of promising results during the summer session. We should centre our efforts on these questions in the course of the intersessional period of work if agreed upon. Along these lines, our delegation will play an active part in compliance with the recent declaration of the Warsaw Treaty States.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for my delegation to join those who have already congratulated you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Your wealth of experience and diplomatic skill will no doubt assist the Conference to advance its work. Your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, deserves our appreciation for the very able manner in which he successfully steered the work of the Conference in the month of June. Let me seize this opportunity to welcome the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Batsanov, to the CD.

Before addressing myself to some of the specific items on our agenda, permit me to comment briefly on the subject of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is increasingly getting worried at the slow pace of negotiations in the various Ad Hoc Committees. Regrettably the Conference has so far not achieved tangible progress on any of the first three items on nuclear disarmament. Yet this inaction has not been due to any lack of texts or proposals. Nor was it due to a lack of serious sense of concern and urgency about the expensive and wasteful arms race. The world cannot however wait for a passive CD, although it would be wrong to blame the lack of progress on the relative passivity alone.

The increasing shift of responsibility, of emphasis and attention, from the CD to other forums where more credible disarmament negotiations are taking place has continuously denied the Conference the much-needed political will which forms the basis of our work. Of course, it may not be realistic to expect that every effort in the field of disarmament, nuclear or conventional weapons, should await the pleasure of the Conference. To do so would be to exaggerate the importance and role of the CD. This notwithstanding, its actions or inactions are having telling effects on its credibility, thereby leading to serious diffusion of responsibility for disarmament negotiations. My delegation believes there is a point in all this. As the single world forum for multilateral negotiations in the field of disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament must profess and defend its relevance by being aware of its responsibilities and obligations. It must set its house in order by being responsive to the aspirations of mankind. The impression must not be created that the Governments represented in the CD are less committed to it than they are to the other forums. In short, the CD must confront its 1989 approved programme of work and adopt a more realistic, flexible and rewarding method of accomplishing it.

The current international situation should be seen not as a deterrent to disarmament negotiations, but rather as a catalyst to those negotiations. The yearning of the international community to remove the danger of nuclear war should find expression in the realization by the Conference of the urgent need for all nuclear-weapon States to cease the testing of nuclear weapons. There is a need for all delegations to confront in a more constructive manner the two central and priority issues before this Conference, namely - the nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The intensity of the consideration of these items on our agenda underscores their importance not only as indicated in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, but also as the direct response to the legitimate concerns of the international community over the increasing arms race. We cannot deny the importance and the urgency attached to these questions, and to the need to initiate substantive multilateral negotiations as indicated in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Despite the concern of the international community about the irrationality of the race for the development of sophisticated nuclear weapons, the arms race continues unabated. Admittedly, by signing the INF Treaty, both the Soviet Union and the United States have demonstrated their recognition of the advantages of seeking security through disarmament and co-operation. The INF no doubt constitutes a milestone in international disarmament efforts. This however represents one step in a journey of a thousand kilometres to establish a just and lasting peace in the world.

Certain basic factors have already been accepted by all as prerequisites for effective nuclear disarmament negotiations. Among these factors are: the undiminished security of all States at progressively lower levels of armaments; account to be taken of the relative quantitative and qualitative level of existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States; an adequate measure of verification to be part of each agreement; and the special responsibility devolving on the two nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals. We should, however, bear in mind that the ultimate goal of negotiations is for a total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons such that the undiminished security of all countries, nuclear as well as non-nuclear alike, will be disassociated from nuclear weapons. In this respect, my delegation believes that the question of a comprehensive test ban falls more appropriately within the competence of this Conference. We believe that the time is now ripe for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the item, with appropriate mandate to commence practical work. A comprehensive test-ban treaty should be recognized as an indispensable step on the road to positive nuclear disarmament.

It will be recalled that in the absence of a mandate, six members of the CD launched an initiative last August, proposing an amendment conference for the Partial Test-Ban Treaty as a way of putting the issue of a comprehensive test-ban treaty back on the international agenda. My delegation has always felt that the CTBT is absolutely essential for the preservation of the régime of non-proliferation embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. CTBT is potentially less restrictive and might open the way for the non-NPT signatories to become members. We do not share the view that such a bold initiative could be regarded as irresponsible.

Nigeria was one of the first States to sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We did so because we believed that nuclear weapons were more than weapons of warfare. Indeed, they are too lethal to be used in the game of power politics. As I mentioned in my statement last February, the NPT was conceived as an important instrument to be complemented by other collateral measures for an effective régime on non-proliferation. We knew it was not perfect and that to some extent it was discriminatory and fraught with inequalities of rights and obligations. But we had hoped, perhaps too innocently, that it would arrest the qualitative and quantitative improvement of the existing nuclear arsenal. Was our hope in the Treaty misplaced? Even though we have been denied the economic and scientific benefits of its articles IV and V, where has the lack of progress, the inaction, on the part of the nuclear Powers with respect to the ninth and eleventh preambular paragraphs and article VI of the Treaty led us? Was it too much to expect that the nuclear Powers had the same fears of a nuclear holocaust as we did?

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Do they not also have some obligations to fulfil under the Treaty? This notwithstanding, let me emphasize that Nigeria believes in the Treaty, and similarly, we still believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a few States increases the insecurity of other States.

No State has the right to play dog-in-the-manger in an arms race, to limit the number of nuclear States, as long as it cannot show that it fulfils its obligations towards mankind. It is an unfortunate irony that to become a major Power today, one must possess nuclear weapons.

The year 1990, which is the year for the Third Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, places an added responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation believes that the NPT is a vital ingredient in a nuclear non-proliferation régime. However, if a greater global consensus is to be developed, it will be essential to preserve the advance towards that goal represented by the NPT and to ensure further progress through other instruments. Non-proliferation in the 1990s based exclusively on the NPT may receive a severe set-back in the light of the criticisms of the parties and non-parties alike. If the Conference on Disarmament is not to contribute to that set-back, no obstacle should be put in its way in negotiating an instrument of such vital importance for horizontal as well as vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As the distinguished head of the Swedish delegation, Mrs. Theorin, rightly observed in her statement last June, and I quote: "For the credibility of the NPT régime, and in order to reinforce it, it is imperative that also the nuclear weapon States now fulfil all their obligations - they should promptly agree to start negotiation on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty". We fully share this concern.

Nigeria continues to attach considerable interest to the question of negative security assurances, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on this item with a full negotiating mandate is commendable. From all indications, time had blurred our vision to the extent that what commenced over two decades ago, as a legitimate concern for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States has now come to be associated more with the security of nuclear-weapon States almost to the total exclusion of the former. If we may cast our minds back, the question of negative security assurances came into being about 24 years ago, during the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, when the non-aligned countries in the ENDC specifically sought assurances that renunciation of nuclear weapons would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage and make them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation.

Nigeria had on many occasions made observations on the unilateral declarations and had expressed the position that they were only helpful to the extent that they expressed the concern of nuclear-weapon States involved in the negotiations. The declarations by themselves do not and cannot constitute firm, credible and binding agreements since they were not negotiated and are unverifiable, conflicting in character and subject to divergent interpretations. Above all, the declarations sought to assure the security of nuclear-weapon States only.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

We remain convinced that the most effective measure to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament. Until this is achieved, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. My delegation feels that all nuclear-weapon States should show greater commitment and understanding on this issue. Otherwise, the impression could be created that the nuclear-weapon States only seek to perpetuate their present military superiority and deny others the right to undiminished security. My delegation believes that the nuclear-weapon States have a responsibility to assure non-nuclear-weapon States of their commitment by attending to these legitimate concerns. Unless this is clearly demonstrated, those who have acceded to the 1968 NPT cannot be expected to feel vindicated, and those who did not accept the Treaty would justifiably even move further away from its objectives. The notion that there are two categories of States, one endowed with a sense of responsibility to manage nuclear weapons, while the other cannot be trusted, and must be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons, should be discouraged.

Let me emphasize that the conclusion of an agreement on negative security assurances should not be made conditional upon the implementation of other collateral measures. All other measures should be treated separately on their own merit. Nigeria believes that the States which have demonstrated by renouncing the nuclear option in a legally binding international instrument should also be eligible for negative security assurances, despite the questions being raised about the level that some of them have actually reached in developing their nuclear capability.

Let me briefly comment on the ongoing negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the wise guidance of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France. Nigeria does not possess chemical weapons and has no such weapons from other States stationed on her territory. As has been rightly stressed several times before in the Conference, the credibility of the convention will depend to a large extent on the effectiveness of the verification régime that will finally be elaborated for the convention. The verification régime should therefore give very convincing assurance of compliance with the purposes and objectives of the convention, or that non-compliance will be detected. Such a régime would indeed strengthen the convention.

The many trial inspections undertaken so far are very vital for the elaboration of the verification régime. I wish to place on record our appreciation for the very commendable contribution by the Finnish delegation through its work in developing some basic elements of the inspection activities directly connected with the verification régime of the convention in the area of instrumentation, standard operating procedures and a computerized data base for the identification of the scheduled chemicals. We note with satisfaction the delegation's offer to train analytical chemists in the methods of analysis and instrumentation.

My delegation welcomes the intense discussions held by experts from industry on the question of confidentiality. The need to ensure effective verification by obtaining adequate information from industry was pitted

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

against the demand of industry to severely restrict the information that may be demanded for verification purposes. It is reassuring that although the experts were all too anxious to ensure that industrial secrets were given sufficient consideration and protection, as well as compensation if breached, they were also aware of the need to strengthen the convention.

This brings me to the question of sanctions. This issue received limited attention during the spring session. It is however now receiving serious consideration in Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee. We welcome any measure that can strengthen the convention that is currently being elaborated. The provision of sanctions or penalties for violations of the convention, is one such measure which my delegation attaches great importance to. The nature of the sanctions or penalty should be determined by the extent of the violation. Minor violations should attract automatic and mandatory sanctions while major violations should, after prompt investigation, be dealt with speedily first by the Conference of States parties and thereafter by the Security Council. Once a decision is taken to penalize a violation of the convention, the sanctions should be mandatory, effective and collectively undertaken by all States parties. It is equally important that sanctions should also be applied to non-States parties who violate the convention. By signing the convention a State party will be denying itself the right to produce or acquire this weapon, which a non-State party may produce and even use freely if there is no such deterrent measure. States parties will therefore be at a disadvantage, and also placed at the mercy of the non-States parties which may be tempted to use such weapons against them. Collective action by States parties against such violations of the convention would deter non-States parties from possible breach.

Let me conclude my statement with a brief comment on the forthcoming Canberra Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons. The involvement of experts in the work of the Conference on Disarmament has proved to be very useful in our negotiations. It is hoped that the Canberra meeting will enable the chemical industry to appreciate the need for a chemical weapons convention. However, my delegation is constrained to urge that the Canberra meeting should not be used to promote non-proliferation of chemical weapons, export control of chemicals to developing countries and restriction on transfer of technology to developing countries. To do otherwise would undermine the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament and indeed put in jeopardy the work that has so far been done on the convention.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for his kind words to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq, Ambassador Barzan Al-Tikriti.

Mr. BARZAN AL-TIKRITI (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): First of all, I should like to express my appreciation to the President and to the secretariat of the Disarmament Conference for their untiring efforts to organize our work and enable the Conference to attain its objectives. The people of Iraq share the aspirations of other peoples for a world where peace and security prevail. This is essential for freedom and the furtherance of progress in the spiritual and material spheres of life. Iraq is part of the Arab nation, which believes in peace, equitable relations among peoples and respect for international law and is seeking to ensure that the values of charity, peace

(Mr. Barzan Al-Tikriti, Iraq)

and justice prevail throughout the world. Without such relations among States, durable peace cannot be established, and the disarmament process cannot therefore follow its due course, since an uneasy peace that is liable to be breached forces States to remain constantly on their guard to protect their sovereignty and security and exercise their right to self-defence. International relations have recently been characterized by a relaxation of tension, and this has allowed the international community to find solutions to several regional and international problems and conflicts. However, this relaxation of tension has not so far had the desired effect on the work of the Disarmament Conference, this body which is the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the disarmamemt sphere. As you are all aware, disarmament requires real international co-operation based on good faith with a view to the formulation of universal principles on the basic issues facing the international community, such as the prevention of nuclear war, the banning of tests, the total prohibition of chemical weapons, the achievement of disarmament and the cessation of the arms race. The strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is of particular importance in some regions of the world, especially the Middle East, where there is no doubt that nuclear weapons have appeared, since they have been acquired by Israel. Israel also has chemical weapons and long-range missiles. This necessitates the adoption of appropriate and effective international measures, to denuclearize the Middle East, strengthen peace and security and promote an arms balance there.

The delegation of the Republic of Iraq supports Peru's draft resolution designed to prevent any attack on nuclear facilities because the effects of such an attack would not be confined to the target country but would have far-reaching consequences. The whole of mankind would be affected. In this connection, we remind the Conference of the Israeli aggression in 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which was intended for peaceful purposes, and placed under international supervision. This year we have an opportunity to reaffirm in the Conference Iraq's firm commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and its unswerving support for international endeavours in the field of disarmament. Iraq was one of the first States to accede to the international conventions and treaties in this field.

I should have liked to end my statement here, but for the ill-considered declaration made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran last week, the form and substance of which constituted an unjustified attack on my country. As you are aware, the Conference on Disarmament is the only international body established to conduct negotiations on disarmament and formulate effective measures to control the arms race and to rescue humanity from the spectre of total disaster brought about by the stockpiling of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This Conference is not responsible for finding solutions to regional conflicts; that is the task of other bodies. However, the Iranian régime's representatives are in the habit of taking advantage of this Conference for purposes of propaganda, thereby involving it in matters that are not within its purview and detracting from its credibility as a body in which the whole of humanity has placed its hopes for significant achievements in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Barzan Al-Tikriti, Iraq)

The representatives of the Iranian régime are well aware that this Conference has no mandate to implement Security Council resolution 598, nor does it have competence to intervene in, or seek solutions to, regional conflicts. However, by raising the subject of the war here, they are attempting to evade their responsibilities in regard to the implementation of resolution 598 and justify their reluctance to comply with the agreement of 8 August 1988, under which the two parties have an obligation to hold direct negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations immediately after the entry into force of the cease-fire, with a view to reaching a common understanding on all the other provisions of resolution 598, including the measures and timetables needed to that end.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran feigned dismay at the lack of progress in the implementation of resolution 598, although it is he who has so far refused to enter into direct negotiations, insisting on a selective approach to the implementation of the resolution, which of course commits his Government to absolutely nothing. If the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran is really eager for peace, it might justifiably be wondered why he refuses to enter into direct negotiations, when his Government has undertaken to do so in a document signed by the Secretary-General? If he really believes in the binding nature of resolution 598, has he perhaps forgotten that his country agreed to that resolution only after the collapse of its military front, a whole year after its adoption by the Security Council. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran drew your attention to the question of withdrawal and misconstrued the letter and spirit of the resolution, treating it as a first step towards a comprehensive settlement, although the detailed provisions of the cease-fire have not yet been agreed, nor have they been embodied in any signed document. There is only a moral undertaking to respect the cease-fire, but Iran still refuses to acknowledge that state of affairs. Iran is also refusing to exchange prisoners, despite the effective cessation of hostilities, thereby violating the Geneva Convention of 1949, and has paid no heed to the repeated appeals of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

As I have already said, it does not fall within the purview of this body to examine details of negotiations concerning the implementation of resolution 598, but it is clear that the Iranian Minister has sought to take advantage of this forum solely for purposes of propaganda and in a desperate attempt to raise the question of chemical weapons in the usual misleading Iranian manner. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran seems to forget his Government's intensive endeavours to purchase weapons, including chemical weapons by all legal and illegal means, and the international information media are still talking about the scandals concerning the smuggling of chemical substances in which the Iranian régime was involved. In the most recent scandal, substances smuggled from a European country were seized in a port in the Arabian Gulf. The country concerned expelled the Iranian diplomats involved in these contraband operations. On this point, I should like to remind everyone that Iran was condemned for having used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, as can be seen from the reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations referred to by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran. He selected extracts to use for his own propaganda purposes and set aside everything that condemned his régime. These are the methods of equivocation and prevarication which have become a well-known behavioural characterstic of the Iranian régime. The Iranian Minister's

(Mr. Barzan Al-Tikriti, Iraq)

lamentation over the fate of children is the height of hypocrisy on the part of a régime that used children as human mine detonators, regarding such activities as feats of heroism.

Iraq played a constructive role in the Paris Conference, as everyone knows, and co-operated with other delegations objectively, but the Minsister for Foreign Affairs of Iran has ventured to accuse all the countries which participated in that Conference at Paris of having succumbed to alleged blackmail by Iraq. Everyone knows how the Iranian régime is blackmailing the international community through terrorism and hostage-taking. During the war, Iraq challenged Iran in every international forum, including the United Nations, through the Non-Aligned Movement and the Islamic Conference, proposing that both parties should undertake without reservation, to respect all international treaties and conventions, as well as the rules of international law. The Iranian régime refused to enter into such commitments. Within the context of these endeavours, Iraq affirmed its full willingness to abide by the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 vis-à-vis any country that would for its part comply with the same Protocol, together with the provisions of all treaties, conventions and laws of an international nature. Finally, the most striking aspect of the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran is that it reflects neither a political will to seek peace nor a sincere intention to achieve it. At a very time when endeavours are being made to achieve peace, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of that régime should realize that everybody is aware of what goes on under its rule. Accordingly, his Government should respect present-day rationality, as well as the rules of international relations and civilized behaviour, and abandon its policy of prevarication, deceit and duplicity so as to ensure security, peace, stability and progress for the region and all its peoples. Otherwise the Iranian régime will merely bring distress and ruin on itself.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): We have asked for the floor today to introduce the latest Finnish Blue Book entitled "Standard Operating Procedures for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, Second Proposal for Procedures Supporting the Reference Database". The first chapter of the report has already been presented about two weeks ago as a separate working paper on the instrumentation needed in the verification laboratory.

The starting point for our proposal of standard operating procedures as contained in this report is that the CW convention will include lists of chemicals and that laboratories must be able to monitor these chemicals reliably from real samples. The selection of the analytical instrumentation for a verification laboratory will entirely depend on the listed chemicals. Our methods have been developed for the monitoring of compounds at present listed in the annex on chemicals. At this stage the emphasis is on the chemicals listed in schedule (1), most of which date back to the two world wars. Although our techniques are intended to be universally applicable to a wide array of chemicals, novel agents might require new techniques.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

The present annex contains large families of compounds. The usefulness of monitoring methods depends on the number of compounds to be monitored and on the availability of prerecorded identification data. If the number of compounds is large, they need to be grouped into subgroups to allow monitoring with specific methods. Monitoring of known chemicals, it may be added, is very much easier and speedier than structure elucidation of unknown chemicals.

The general-purpose definition of a chemical-warfare agent - that a chemical is a chemical-warfare agent if it is used for that purpose - will be useful in securing that the convention cannot be circumvented by claiming that an unlisted chemical is not covered by it. The definition can reasonably be applied in cases of alleged use. Owing to the rarity of such occurrences, the samples can be analysed with great care and in detail although the concentrations may be low. In cases of chemicals found in military arsenals there is plenty of the chemical available to enable a thorough analysis to be made quickly. But the general-purpose definition would be unwieldy as a basis for routine inspections of chemical facilities. In those cases the analysis must be based on named compounds whose absence rather than presence is verified. In a plant producing organophosphorus compounds, for example, the samples collected during routine on-site inspections should be monitored for their contents of listed organophosphorus compounds. Without a defined list of banned compounds and prerecorded identification data, the analyst would be faced with the task of identifying all compounds containing phosphorus, including intermediates, by-products, and impurities, in order to decide whether or not they belonged to the families covered by schedule (1). Using the computerized database the identification of a named chemical takes a fraction of a second, even on-site. The structure elucidation of an unnamed chemical could require weeks of hard work.

Accordingly, at least the chemicals in schedule (1) need to be individually defined, to allow the analytical laboratory to sign a report stating that no banned chemicals are present in the samples. The analyst must know exactly what chemicals to look for. The other alternative could be that the chemical industry declares and justifies all production, including raw materials, intermediates, by-products, impurities and so on. And these data would be included in the database of the verification laboratory. While it would succeed in revealing the production of undeclared organophosphorus compounds, I am afraid that it would be unacceptably intrusive and an unwieldy exercise for the Technical Secretariat. Moreover, it would not reveal novel agents whose structural properties were completely different from compounds listed in the schedules, unless declarations and justifications were expected of the whole chemical industry.

One of the tasks of the future Organization will be to follow chemical research and identify new chemicals to be included in the lists and placed under production control. To make implementation easier in the early days of the convention, as much development of analytical methods as possible should be done beforehand. The acquired expertise would also facilitate development and testing of analytical methods for possible novel agents.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

To ensure confidence among the States parties, the verification analyses will have to be done by methods accepted by the Organization. In our view, what this entails is the establishment of standard operating procedures and an analytical database accessible to all participating laboratories. The Finnish Research Project has been working toward this end for 15 years now.

The present report is a revised version of the proposed standard operating procedures for verification analyses presented in Report D.1 last year. Increased emphasis is now placed on quality control. Testing procedures are presented with a view to achieving good repeatability and reproducibility of results in different laboratories, which is needed to guarantee the reliability of analysis. It is essential that the quality of the analyses be demonstrated when the results must hold up in a court of law. Reproducibility also maximizes the advantages of an analytical database as a reference.

For this report we investigated 40 chemical warfare agents and their homologues. All relevant data including the spectra are annexed to this volume. As of now, all new data will be included in the VERIFY database immediately after analysis of compounds.

The methods we describe are written separately for each technique, so that each technique can exist independently. The eventual selection of equipment can be expected to vary from laboratory to laboratory and we wish to show what can be achieved with each technique separately.

The analytical procedure in each laboratory can be chosen on the basis of the combination of techniques available to the laboratory, the type of sample, and the nature of the task. During routine inspections the task may be the identification of known compounds. Challenge inspections may require also structure elucidation of unknown compounds.

It is our earnest hope that the basic work we are doing will prove useful to the Preparatory Commission and Technical Secretariat as they commence their arduous task of developing verification methodology and data in the first years after the convention has been opened for signature. In the meantime we will be happy if our efforts support and facilitate the ongoing negotiations in Geneva and the work of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in investigating the alleged uses of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Finland for her statement. There is no one else on the list of speakers. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? No.

The secretariat has today distributed at my request an informal document giving the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary organs for next week. As usual, it is merely indicative and can be modified later if the nature of our work makes that necessary. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference accepts the timetable.

It was so decided.

(The President)

I would remind you that immediately after the plenary meeting next Tuesday, the Conference is to hold an informal meeting to consider new measures in the field of disarmament to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof. I will now adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be on Tuesday, 18 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.518
18 July 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE 518th PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 18 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

GE.89-62379/0776B

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 518th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will today continue its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, under rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of France, Ambassador Morel, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, let me say first of all how pleased my delegation is to see you acting as President of the Conference for the month of July. We are sure that the experience and skill you have long displayed will help us to make significant progress in our work. Let me add that your knowledge of our language and your vigilance with regard to the use of French are highly appreciated and are for me personally additional grounds for satisfaction. May I also say, as I have already had occasion to do, that it is a further source of satisfaction to see you in the Chair during the month in which both the Mongolian and the French national holidays fall.

I should also like to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador García Robles, for the exemplary way in which he presided over our work in June during the important period when the Conference was resuming its work.

Mr. MOREL (France): All delegations have stressed, from the very beginning of this session, how much the recent improvement in the international situation is helping to revive the negotiations on arms control and disarmament. We, of course, share that view. But how can we fail to notice at the same time that there is no reason at all for euphoria? We can see still more clearly in these favourable circumstances that disarmament will not come about by itself. Now that we have got past the stage of breaking the political deadlock, we have entered upon another period which may be, which ought to be, a period of consolidation. If I hesitate, it is because we realize every day that an unceasing effort is required to equip ourselves for future success. This applies to the major negotiations under way in the nuclear, chemical and conventional fields, but also to space, and to the other items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

Nothing can be gained in the field of disarmament without stubborn effort. The international community is too big, the challenges of security are too complex and the progress of technology is too disconcerting for us merely to sit back and say the wind is in our favour. Let me add here that being at present Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I am made very directly aware of the chances and risks involved in disarmament negotiations. The process of drafting the future convention banning chemical weapons, which I will not discuss today, speaks volumes, more perhaps than might be thought, on the opportunities and difficulties involved in the present situation. The Paris Conference has given an unprecedented boost to our negotiations. But it has not freed us from the difficulties inherent in

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this unique exercise, and we realize every day that to "redouble our efforts" is not just an empty phrase or a useful formula, but a practical necessity. In a little over a month I shall be introducing the Committee's report to the Conference, that is to say, the new version of the "rolling text", and at that time I shall have to review all aspects of the chemical negotiations. Today I will just say that the remaining month's work we have to do on the substance is of the greatest importance. I believe all delegations are aware of the fact. They have all in various ways indicated their availability, and the Committee has put itself in a position to make progress. It is now up to each of us to play his part.

But I should like today to range further afield and begin by pointing out that the major disarmament negotiations are marked by one and the same imperative, one and the same urgency. How indeed could we fail to meet the challenge of the extraordinary combination of circumstances before us?

In the field of nuclear disarmament, first of all, the bilateral negotiations on Soviet and United States strategic arms and on space have just started up again. We all know their aims, which are ambitious ones, particularly the 50 per cent cut in stockpiles, and my country supports those aims. Even if no specific deadline has been set, everybody agrees that these negotiations cannot go on for ever without producing any results. The two partners wanted to reach a conclusion by the end of 1988. Circumstances prevented them from doing so, and we all know that the matter is a particularly difficult one. But the international community can and should remind the two most heavily armed Powers of its legitimate impatience to see them achieve the goal they themselves have set.

As far as conventional disarmament is concerned, these negotiations are also ambitious ones, since to find a stable level that would be adequate for the conventional armed forces in Europe of the countries belonging to the two alliances would end the overarming which has dominated our continent's history for more than 40 years and impeded its free development. For those who negotiated the terms of reference in Vienna the aim was to succeed in the near future, within a few years. The top leaders of the Western countries meeting at the NATO summit last May decided to reduce the period still further. My country, which launched the proposal for a disarmament conference in Europe 11 years ago, at the first special session, a proposal that has now become a reality, expects a great deal from the stimulus thus given to these major negotiations. First reactions from the East seem to be promising. What now has to be done is to draw the practical consequences in Vienna.

Returning for a moment to the negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons, I note that without fixing a deadline, the Paris Conference emphasized in its debates, and also in the Final Declaration of 11 January, how essential it was to achieve success within the next few years.

What all this means is that we are faced with an exceptional set of circumstances implying the conclusion within a brief stretch of time of major negotiations in three fields - nuclear, conventional and chemical - and three separate exercises - bilateral, regional and multilateral. The most remarkable thing, perhaps, is that this is not a prearranged plan; this triple

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rendezvous is first and foremost an indication of the impatience of both Governments and peoples, which are now resolved to break the vicious circle of ruinous overarming.

If the disarmament negotiations are today seeking with one bound to advance the course of history, they must more than ever remain within the limits of what is reasonable. Since there are now various real opportunities for us to seize, clearly identified by agreement between States, we should be particularly suspicious of utopias and guard against disputes of an ideological nature. It is not by assailing the present state of affairs in international security that we shall improve it. It is not the practice of deterrence that is to be condemned, but war in all its forms, which must be made ever more impossible. It is not by attacking a country's legitimate defence options as a matter of course that we shall get progress in disarmament negotiations.

As far as my own country is concerned, I would remind you that it is ready to participate in nuclear disarmament when the time comes, once three well-known conditions are fulfilled, namely, a radical change in the present gap between our strategic resources and those of the United States and the USSR, a halt to the race in defensive technology, whether space, anti-missile or anti-submarine, and the implementation of conventional disarmament and total prohibition of chemical weapons. For the time being, France notes that the two super-Powers' stockpiles are still growing, even if the recent Treaty on intermediate nuclear forces has for the first time committed its signatories to genuine destruction of some weapons. While waiting for this trend to be followed up worldwide, France will therefore continue to maintain forces of a quality and quantity just above the credibility threshold, in the belief that strict sufficiency is the golden rule in security.

I would remind you in this connection of France's position on the cessation of nuclear tests. We consider that it is not a real priority in nuclear disarmament, and, for reasons I have just mentioned, we cannot accept a total ban imposing programmed obsolescence on our forces, which would undermine our security capacity. The two super-Powers are free to set their own rules themselves. Whatever agreements they may reach, it is clear that the considerable experience they have accumulated in this field over the past 40 years puts them in a different situation from us. Our criterion is and remains the sufficiency necessary to maintain our security.

As far as the work of the Disarmament Conference on these matters is concerned, we shall not stand in the way of any procedural agreements that may be reached, but, as in the past, we shall refrain from participating in any exercise which corresponds to a conception of nuclear disarmament that we do not share.

If there is another aspect of nuclear disarmament in which we have to be reasonable, it is the question of short-range nuclear missiles stationed in Europe. I will merely say that we do not believe it is possible to change the order of priority that emerges clearly from the negotiations now under way.

After mentioning chemical, conventional and nuclear weapons, I should now like to deal at greater length with space, which is not given the importance it deserves in multilateral forums. Rather than attribute this to ill-will on

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the part of States, it would be better to recognize the special nature of space activities, which makes them complicated to deal with. Space differes from other sectors of disarmament in that the main kinds of equipment involved, i.e. satellites, use technology that is still evolving. A state of continuing uncertainty as to their future development prevents us from weighing all the strategic implications and thus limits the possibility of negotiating on such systems. Hence it is difficult to distinguish in advance what is important in security terms from what is secondary, and what is dangerous from what is effective.

Faced with such complexity, we should avoid over-simplification and look the facts clearly in the face, which means in effect recognizing certain points: it would be both illusory and inopportune to envisage complete demilitarization of outer space; the present legal régime for space is not adequate by itself to prevent an arms race there; an absolute ban on anti-satellite systems appears to be unverifiable in practice, because no general régime can effectively cover very different kinds of devices; finally, the anti-satellite and anti-missile fields are closely linked, and no multilateral regulation exercise aimed at prohibiting the permanent placing of weapons in space could advance independently of the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations, nor a fortiori more rapidly than those negotiations.

These few considerations thus lead us to rule out measures which, however attractive they seem, would in reality be delusive or unsuitable for multilateral treatment.

Does this mean we should give up and regard the prevention of an arms race in space as too much for the international community? Certainly not. The multilateral bodies, and first and foremost the Conference on Disarmament, have a special role to play, alongside bilateral efforts, in promoting further thought on these subjects and resolving the deadlock we are faced with at the moment.

We should first of all continue to improve our technical knowledge of the issues and difficulties of disarmament in space, without which it will not be possible to reach any specific agreement on the means to be applied. The Conference on Disarmament can and should also identify pragmatically the fields in which a consensus seems possible here and now. From this standpoint, France notes that there has been a welcome change of attitude in two important fields, on which I should now like to dwell: firstly the increasing recognition of the usefulness of space for monitoring and verification; and secondly, the growth in many countries' interest in the subject of the legal immunity of satellites.

As regards the first, the development of facilities for observation shows that space is not just an area for disarmament; it is also a potential tool of disarmament, given the possibility of satellite verification of agreements. Recent trends, marked in particular by growing recognition of the stabilizing role of observation satellites and the appearance of high-resolution satellites other than those of the United States and the USSR, mean that one can envisage a greater contribution by space facilities to the verification of disarmament agreements and confirms in the event the validity of the course France has been proposing since 1978.

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After submitting at the first special session on disarmament a proposal for an international satellite monitoring agency (ISMA), which was thoroughly studied by a United Nations group of experts from 1979 to 1981, France proposed at the third SSOD in June 1988 that the first phase envisaged under the ISMA should be implemented, in the form of an agency for the processing of satellite images, or APSI.

Without giving up the more ambitious objective set in 1978, we have since realized the need in present circumstances to distinguish very clearly between monitoring and verification. The latter is only possible within the framework of a specific agreement, in order to ensure that the agreement is being complied with, and it can only be carried out by the countries parties to that agreement.

It would certainly be conceivable, in the long term, to develop, for the benefit of the whole international community or of the parties to a particular treaty, either general observation satellites or specialized satellites for the verification of compliance with a particular provision. That is one of the things envisaged for the third phase of the agency we proposed in 1978.

But it seems to us preferable at the present stage to set as the objective for the initial phase the pooling of existing data. The space image processing agency proposed in 1988 would not cost very much, but it would enable national experts to be given the necessary training in the interpretation of space images and above all would make it possible to assess what could actually be achieved with satellites later on in the fields of monitoring and verification. This preliminary phase should thus provide an opportunity to determine the specific requirements for new systems and possible future applications.

It must however be clear that such an agency would merely be a confidence-building device and would not be designed to form the embryo of a verification system attached to the United Nations with universal competence. The principle of the specificity of verification in fact argues against the idea that the international community as a whole should be responsible for verifying any disarmament agreement, whatever its nature and whoever the parties, and seek to employ one single instrument for that purpose. The way to achieve the best possible use of space facilities for purposes of security, stability and disarmament is thus for the time being to establish as clear a distribution of responsibilities as possible. If we try and mix everything up together, we shall not make progress anywhere.

The same applies when we make a combined effort to guarantee the security of space activities that deserve to be protected, which is the second component of our proposals in this field. We should continue our efforts to arrive at a consensus on measures acceptable to everyone in order to prevent the arms race in space. But the present difficulties show that the legal approach, through satellite immunity, is the one most in keeping with the Disarmanent Conference's capacity for action. We observe with interest, moreover, that this theme is coming up more and more often in statements made at this Conference. The idea of immunity is at the heart of the proposals submitted by France in recent years. We should like today to propose that the

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international community's work in this field should be organized around three points, which will be developed this afternoon in the statement to be made to the Ad hoc Committee by Mr. de La Chapelle, an expert from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The first point we propose, and there are three of them, is the principle of non-interference. Recognizing to start with that the only effective criterion for identifying satellites deserving protection is whether or not they have the capacity to interfere actively with another satellite, we can arrive at a precise definition of the principle of non-interference with non-aggressive space activities, which should apply to all devices that are not themselves equipped for such interference. For the time being, this principle is not mentioned explicitly except in United States-Soviet bilateral agreements. It has the merit of being much more precise than the provision in the Charter of the United Nations on the simple non-use of force and should therefore, in our view, be given fully explicit recognition by the international community as a whole. Such confirmation might not be enough on its own to give space objects absolute protection. But it would at least enable the States to make a precise commitment on a common rule already formulated and designed precisely for space activities.

The second point we are proposing in order to organize the work is the space code of conduct. It is clear that adoption of the principle of non-interference will not have any effect unless it is accompanied by definite rules to facilitate compliance, in two ways.

Firstly, implementation of the principle of non-interference requires first of all a better knowledge of the characteristics of space objects, and hence a strengthening of the Registration Convention of 1975. The degree of precision that would be adequate remains to be determined and the legal framework to be adopted for the new régime has not been established. Should we revise the 1975 Convention or adopt a new document? It is still too early to decide. On the other hand, it should be possible to determine in an initial stage the possible content of such a strengthened registration régime with a view to promoting greater security for space activities.

Secondly, as far as this code of conduct is concerned, however reliable the future registration régime may be, it should be accompanied by precise rules of behaviour for space objects in order to reduce the risk of incidents, and above all to avoid their misinterpretation. Ignorance of the space environment and the diversity of possible kinds of interference with equipment in orbit might at a time of tension cause cessation of the operation of one of these satellites to be misinterpreted as being the result of hostile action justifying retaliation. The aim is thus to have a better knowledge at all times of the immediate environment of each space object, and hence of the dangers to which it is exposed.

These two components, the registration system and the rules of behaviour, should constitute an initial code of conduct, which would be expanded later as space activities developed. This pragmatic approach, based on confidence-building measures, could in our view constitute an acceptable working basis for all States. It does not prejudge their readiness to sign

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prohibition or limitation agreements later on and does not in any way impede the bilateral negotiations. It is not designed to achieve by roundabout means the equivalent of prohibition, but at the same time it does leave room for adjustment to developments in technical capacities and to increases in confidence so that more binding measures could be worked out if States came to want them.

The third point for organizing work on the prevention of an arms race in space is the trajectography centre. The strengthened registration system and the formulation of rules of conduct will have to be based on an appropriate instrument reconciling the requirements of technological and military confidentiality with the need to gather all the requisite information concerning the trajectories of all satellites. After an initial consideration of this question, my country takes the view that a centralized data system could store and process, without publishing them, the parameters communicated at the time of registration and on subsequent updatings. The trajectography centre would be permanently engaged in calculating all the available trajectories and as such would have a double role: under normal circumstances it would spontaneously issue a warning if satellites were getting too close on the same orbit or were liable to pass too close; in the event of an accident leading to allegations of deliberate collision, it would be able through consultation machinery to furnish proof of good faith. Such a system could be run discreetly and simply. It would be attached, like the agency for the processing of satellite images, to the United Nations Secretariat and would be open to all States possessing or using satellites that wanted to take advantage of it.

Those are the main proposals that our expert will be submitting to the Committee this afternoon.

I should like, finally, to turn briefly to three other items on our agenda, namely, negative security assurances, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament. On the first of these items, my country has already indicated on a number of occasions, in the appropriate Ad hoc Committee, that it was ready to join with other delegations in trying to find a common arrangement by which the nuclear Powers would give the non-nuclear-weapon countries assurances against the use or threat of the use of such weapons.

But here again we must be careful not to be unrealistic. Working out such a formula is not just a matter for the nuclear Powers, which have already given credible assurances in the form of unilateral declarations. This will have to be a joint effort, which cannot disregard the existence of those declarations. Any partial or unbalanced approach, any kind of accusation, can only hinder this effort.

I should like to make it plain to the Conference here that I cannot pass over in silence the remarks made recently on this matter by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Both because of their substance and because of the fact that the representative of that country to the Conference on Disarmament is acting this year as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances, I have to say that to present a caricature of the situation does not help us to arrive at the compromise solutions we all want.

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As far as radiological weapons are concerned, my delegation has noted with interest the ideas put forward by the representative of Hungary on the scope of a convention banning such weapons in the traditional sense. These ideas deserve careful study in Contact Group A of the Ad hoc Committee. As far as the prohibition of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities is concerned, on the other hand, we understand the interest in this subject, but we must say once again that we still think the Conference on Disarmament is not competent to negotiate an agreement in this field. As the representative of Peru has pointed out, nuclear facilities are already protected by the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and if strengthening of the system is necessary, it is within that framework that it would have to be negotiated.

Finally, on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, my delegation has constantly sought to indicate its willingness to contribute to the efforts being made to find generally acceptable solutions to the questions that are still outstanding. It hopes that here too a spirit of compromise will prevail and that a consensus can emerge on the whole range of complex fields covered by the comprehensive programme. The time already spent on drafting the document is in itself a sign of the difficulty of the exercise. Let us therefore beware of simplistic or over hasty formulas; let us prefer pragmatism to dogmatism.

Throughout this statement, I have tried to stress that disarmament will not come about of its own accord and that we cannot bring it any nearer by means of slogans or clichés. Developments in this field in recent years, and indeed in recent months, have been very instructive: where a genuine opportunity has been duly identified and there is a real desire to succeed as soon as possible, there can be rapid, substantial, and I would even say exceptional progress. That is true in relations between two States, or at the level of a region, but also for the whole international community, that is to say, in particular for the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Morel, for his statement and for his kind and generous words for the Chair.

I have no further speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. ARDAKANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Since the distinguished Ambassador of France referred to the statement by our Foreign Minister here regarding the work of the Conference, I think it is not a matter of dispute, but rather that both are speaking for the same goal, probably from a different angle, and I think this is a healthy way of conducting the work. As Ambassador Morel has stressed again, all of us are trying to find a common formula in the areas that we think are important for the work of the CD and ad hoc committees have been established for it. I think we would take what Ambassador Morel has said as a way of offering further collaboration rather than raising a point of dispute.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to speak? That does not seem to be the case.

I now turn to the requests made by non-member States to participate in the informal meeting for consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof. The relevant draft decisions have been circulated today in working paper CD/WP.369 and Add.1-10. The States parties to the sea-bed treaty which are asking to participate in the informal meeting are the following: Austria, Ireland, Republic of Korea, Viet Nam, Spain, Malaysia, Finland, Turkey, New Zealand, Norway and Denmark. Since there has been no objection to the idea of inviting the non-member States concerned to participate in the informal meeting, I suggest that we should now consider all the requests together. It is of course understood that that will not constitute a precedent for the work of the Conference. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decisions.

It was so decided.

I would remind delegations that immediately after today's plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting for consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof. There are no further items to consider today, and I shall therefore adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 20 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.